Collective opinion. Dictionary

Keywords

COLLECTIVE OPINION / COLLECTIVE MOOD / INTRA-COLLECTIVE TRADITIONS / FORMING TECHNOLOGY/ MILITARY PERSONNEL / COLLECTIVE OPINION / COLLECTIVE MOOD / INTRA COLLECTIVE TRADITIONS / TECHNOLOGY OF FORMATION / MILITARY PERSONNEL

Annotation scientific article on psychological sciences, author of the scientific work - Isaeva Natalya Nikolaevna

The article reveals formation technologies such important socio-psychological phenomena as collective opinion, collective mood And intra-collective traditions, in the unit of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, shows the relevance of the work of the unit commander in the formation of these socio-psychological phenomena that contribute to the unity of personnel and increasing the combat readiness of the unit. An important task of the commander’s activity when forming a military team is a comprehensive study collective opinion, collective mood and traditions for their development. With the purposeful continuous work of formation officers collective opinion, collective mood And intra-collective traditions the commander will be able to achieve high educational effectiveness of the military unit and strong military discipline in it. Control collective opinion and mood, the ability to create positive traditions in the unit, unity of thoughts and feelings, eliminate emotional contradictions, form collective demands - these are the areas that contribute to the unity of personnel and increasing the combat readiness of the internal troops unit.

Text of scientific work on the topic “Aspects of studying collective opinion, collective mood and intra-collective traditions in a military unit”

BBK 88.83 UDC 159.9

Aspects of studying collective opinion, collective mood and intra-collective traditions in a military unit

N.N. Isaeva

St. Petersburg Military Institute of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia (St. Petersburg, Russia)

Aspects of Studying of Collective Opinion, Collective Mood and Intra Collective Traditions in the Division of the Military Personnel

Saint-Petersburg Military Institute of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior Russia (Saint-Petersburg, Russia)

The article reveals the technologies for the formation of such important socio-psychological phenomena as collective opinion, collective mood and intra-collective traditions in the unit of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, shows the relevance of the work of the unit commander in the formation of these socio-psychological phenomena that contribute to the unity of personnel and increase combat unit readiness.

An important task of the commander’s activity when forming a military team is a comprehensive study of collective opinion, collective mood and traditions for their development. With the purposeful continuous work of officers to form a collective opinion, collective mood and intra-collective traditions, the commander will be able to achieve high educational effectiveness of the military unit and strong military discipline in it.

Managing collective opinion and mood, the ability to create positive traditions in a unit, unity of thoughts and feelings, eliminating emotional contradictions, and forming collective demands - these are the areas that contribute to the unity of personnel and increasing the combat readiness of an internal troops unit. Key words: collective opinion, collective mood, intra-collective traditions, formation technology, military personnel.

DOI 10.14258/izvasu(2015)3.1-08

The most important task for the commander when forming a military collective is to study collective opinion, collective mood and traditions. With the targeted continuous work of the officers to form collective opinion, collective mood and intra collective traditions, the commander will achieve the consolidation of the personnel; increase the morale of the division, and strong military discipline.

To manage collective opinion and collective mood, to be able to create positive traditions, conformity, to eliminate the conflicts and to form collective demands are the priorities to promote the consolidation of the personnel and strengthen the morale in subdivisions of the internal troops.

Key words: collective opinion, collective mood, intra collective traditions, technology of formation, military personnel.

The activities of military personnel in military units and divisions are most often collective. The structure of the military collective includes various

diverse social psychological phenomena such as leadership, competition, rivalry, conformism, etc. However, the greatest influence on the effectiveness

The effectiveness of service and combat activities is influenced by collective opinion, collective mood, and intra-collective traditions. The life activity of individual military personnel and military units as a whole and the effectiveness of their activities depend on these phenomena. With a favorable moral and psychological climate, a positive collective mood, readiness for active actions the quality of fulfillment of the service and combat missions assigned to the unit is improved.

The most important tasks pedagogical activity when forming a military team, a comprehensive study of collective opinion, collective mood and traditions is carried out with the aim of their further development and improvement.

As you know, collective opinion is formed in the process of communication and interaction between people, constant live exchange of impressions, thoughts, views, beliefs, feelings and experiences.

Coming from judgments individuals, the collective opinion is not simple arithmetic sum these individual judgments. Individual opinions of members of a military unit, as a result of interaction with the opinions of colleagues, undergo changes, forming a mass socio-psychological phenomenon. This phenomenon of the spiritual life of a collective is very complex, dynamic, changeable, and can easily change from positive to negative, and this poses a particular danger to the combat effectiveness of the military collective.

Why is it important for a unit commander to be able to manage the formation of collective opinion? Because it has a huge impact on the personality of a serviceman: firstly, collective opinion is a source of socio-psychological information from environment(team). Secondly, collective opinion informs the serviceman about the reaction of the team to his actions and actions and thereby directs and regulates his behavior in accordance with the requirements established in a given military team. Thirdly, collective opinion expresses the attitude of team members towards a given serviceman. The group itself continuously compares the behavior of each of its members with the system of norms existing within this group or collective, and, as it were, “authorizes” and encourages or discourages the behavior of each. Since a person is not at all indifferent to how other people with whom he works, lives, serves, who approve or condemn, condemn his actions and deeds treat him, he coordinates his behavior with the requirements of the collective.

Externally, this influence appears in the form of a specific assessment of actions and actions. However,

embodies not only ideas, views, but also the will, feelings and perceptions of the mass of people. Hence, collective opinion combines both persuasion and psychological coercion. It is in this regard that there is an opinion among teachers and psychologists that the strength of the team lies in the collective opinion.

The military collective’s assessments of the serviceman’s actions are systematic, prompt and public. They are given everywhere and continuously and, as a rule, are undeniable.

Therefore, collective opinion evokes a person’s need for self-esteem and deeply affects the area of feelings, causing not only negative feelings (shame, remorse), but also positive ones (satisfaction, joy, pride, personal dignity, duty, honor, responsibility to the team). All this encourages military personnel to improve themselves.

The strength of collective opinion is also explained by the fact that, once it has arisen and become established, it turns into a kind of evaluative standard, a stamp. And practice shows that such stamps last a very long time. They are learned according to the following principle: “That’s what everyone thinks, that’s what they do, that means it’s right, that’s how it should be.”

Collective opinion performs a wide variety of functions in the spiritual life of people. In relation to the staff of an internal troops unit, it is a concentration of collective experience in the field of performing combat service tasks and mastering military skills.

It is difficult to find among military personnel indifferent to collective opinion and its assessments. Some military personnel are accustomed to respecting it, others do not violate the instructions of group behavior for fear of applying collective sanctions (moral condemnation, reproach, anger, ridicule, boycott, etc.). Consequently, with the help of collective opinion, it is possible to control the behavior of individual military personnel, encourage them to do good work and deter them from committing disciplinary offenses. That is, the collective opinion is very effective remedy education and self-education. It unites the military collective and mobilizes it to solve service and combat tasks.

The effectiveness of the functions of collective opinion that motivate and regulate the behavior of individual military personnel and units is explained by the following properties:

A combination of persuasion and psychological coercion, because it concentratedly expresses the mind, will and feelings of a mass of people (judgments and assessments of positive collective opinion evoke in a person the need for conscious self-esteem, deeply affecting the area of feelings, and generate an active desire for self-improvement);

Promptness in reaction to events, systematicity, publicity and inevitability of assessments of an individual’s actions from the immediate social environment;

The ability of a number of collective (group) judgments to turn into evaluative standards and influence not only consciousness, but also the subconscious sphere of the human psyche.

The formation of a collective opinion in many military units often occurs spontaneously, without commanders and superiors knowing the mechanism of its development. In educational work, collective opinion is sometimes used ineptly, ineffectively, and in some military groups it is not taken into account at all. This makes commanders' efforts less effective. educational work and reduces the quality of performance of the service and combat missions assigned to the unit.

In the daily practice of departments at meetings and conferences, two opinions are sometimes discovered: one is official, often calm on the outside, and the other is internal, behind the scenes, deeply hidden in the relationships of various groups and team members. And this second is often more effective, effective in real life, division affairs.

Sometimes in a unit, outward disobedience, arguing with the commander, superior, etc. are considered a sign of courage and independence. These and other stereotypes and cliches seem harmless at first glance. But this is only at first glance, but in reality they negatively affect the mental state, collective mood and activity of people; military personnel develop such negative qualities as irresponsibility, passivity, individualism, dishonesty, and sometimes rudeness. To prevent such phenomena from occurring in military collectives, it is necessary to firmly know that the opinion of the collective, depending on the content and direction, can have an impact different influence on people. Hence, the primary duty of all commanders is to take care of the direction of collective opinion, its unity and the coincidence of collective opinion with the opinion of the unit commander.

The direction and unity of collective opinion are the main indicators of its educational value.

The opinion of the team is a multifaceted and very dynamic phenomenon. Service activity shows that on every issue of life, study, military service There is usually no absolute consensus from the very beginning. There is only a more or less pronounced tendency towards unity. Predominantly, this tendency in direction corresponds to moral norms, the requirements of the oath, general military regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, orders and orders. But the degree of maturity

opinions vary. And this is no coincidence, because its carriers are specific people or separate groups of military personnel. It can be observed that soldiers have different attitudes towards the same fact, the same actions: some condemn, others support. Moreover, some evaluate actions based on their life experience, norms and rules of traditions and culture, while others are sometimes guided by backward, philistine criteria. Such discrepancies are observed in communication, in everyday life, everyday life Sometimes this is visible at meetings, more often in conversations of soldiers in their circle, where they reason as follows: “meeting is one thing, life is another.”

In the collectives of internal troops there are no objective reasons or social conditions for the emergence of a double opinion that diverges from the official opinion, legal and moral norms of behavior. However, due to individual characteristics military personnel, purely subjective psychological reasons In some groups, a negative collective opinion arises.

How to manage the formation of collective opinion? Knowing the stages of its development, you can effectively influence the process of formation of the team’s opinion. First of all, the commander must know the opinion of his team on the events taking place, and if this opinion does not quite coincide with his opinion, then appropriate work is carried out with the unit’s assets or with sergeants and squad leaders. Experienced commanders themselves promptly try to inform their subordinates about current events, participate in discussions, not miss the moment when military personnel directly experience events, promptly identify sources, specific carriers of false views. At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind that the emerging and established opinion of the team turns into a standard over time, and if you do not monitor its development and changes, then it can turn into prejudice, and sometimes into prejudice. It is necessary to constantly take care of the formation of the correct collective opinion and subsequently, in connection with changes in the conditions of service and the operational situation, make appropriate adjustments.

This is all, of course, possible, but under one condition: if the commander is in close communication with his subordinates, has constant personal contact with them, knows their needs and requirements, moods and mental state, events of their service and personal life.

Formation the right opinion team for a specific job task begins with setting general goals and objectives for the department and presenting specific requirements both to the team as a whole and to each of its members individually.

In this case, the commander pays special attention to the explanation and justification of the assigned tasks. Finding out the circle of people who are passive and sometimes negative. On the one hand, the authority of activists is increased in every possible way, their decisive influence on the rest of the team is ensured, on the other hand, carriers of false views are decisively exposed, their false authority is debunked, they are deprived of the opportunity to exert a negative influence on the unit.

Meetings play an important role in the formation of collective opinion. The meeting, being a means of forming an opinion, also acts as an official form of expression and consolidation of collective opinion. It is at meetings, through the efforts of advanced soldiers, activists, and commanders, that a correct assessment of events in the life of a unit or unit is developed, individual false opinions are broken down and true ones are affirmed. But this happens at a meeting only when, even before it begins, the commander conducts preparatory work, namely, takes measures to prevent negative opinions:

Preliminarily forms the unity of views of the most influential people in the team (formal and sometimes informal leaders of microgroups);

Gives individual assignments for working with colleagues, as well as with microgroups from whom one can expect an incorrect attitude towards a particular issue being resolved.

Collective opinion becomes completely unified and most effective when the criteria for official and unofficial assessments converge. To achieve this, commanders need to conduct individual work with military personnel prone to violations of the requirements of general military regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, military discipline and service, to combat false views and criteria for assessing behavior.

Finally, in forming the right collective opinion in the unit significant role plays a role in organizing and conducting systematic informing of military personnel on issues of intra-collective life.

Thus, collective opinion plays a role in the education of military personnel of the internal troops. huge role and has a great influence on the effectiveness of the service and combat activities of units. The educational functions of the team are strong due to its unity and the direction of collective opinion. On the path of its formation, the unit commander will be able to achieve high educational efficiency of the military collective, strong military discipline in it and high quality performing service and combat missions.

Formation of a positive collective

opinions are promoted by the positive sentiments existing in the military collective.

Collective mood is a joint experience of certain events, facts, as well as similar emotional states that have taken possession of the entire team (or most of it) for some time and influence its life and activities.

It is known that the full knowledge, skills and combat skills of individual military personnel and the coherence of the entire unit are manifested against the background of positive mental states. The negative mood of the team, for example, despondency, despair, stress, fear, reduce the effectiveness of military training and can completely paralyze their combat activity.

Collective moods play a significant role in the daily life of the unit. They influence the success of service, military discipline, and relationships. Moods such as emotional uplift, belief in overall success, passion, and elation contribute to the success of the entire unit. Others: a state of decline, lack of faith in one’s own strengths and the strength of the team, despondency - reduce the quality of service and discipline.

A study of the conditions for increasing people's performance showed that the mood of the team is directly dependent on labor productivity. If average labor productivity is taken as the beginning of the measure, then when good mood it is 0.8-4.2% higher, and if it is bad, it is 2.5-18% lower than average.

The mood is especially strongly reflected in discipline and organization. Moods such as group boredom, dissatisfaction, hostility, not to mention panic, are serious preconditions for misconduct, and sometimes even crimes. Therefore, it is important for the commander to know that under the influence of a dominant negative mood, even disciplined military personnel violate the general military regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and commit disciplinary offenses. And vice versa, there are often cases when, under the influence of the dominant positive mood of the team (group of military personnel), even undisciplined soldiers begin to behave better, more disciplined.

It is also necessary to keep in mind that the emotional factor in the conditions of a military collective manifests itself especially clearly and visibly. This is due to the characteristics of the service: increased danger to the life and health of military personnel, the emotional intensity of military service, frequent physical and mental overload, surprise and uncertainty of the situation. To overcome these difficulties, military cooperation, organic unity with the entire team, and cohesion are especially valuable.

The professional responsibility of the unit commander is to take care of creating an atmosphere of elation, a cheerful tone in the team, and maintaining positive emotional states.

But, unfortunately, this is not always done; in practice, there are cases when the collective mood is either not taken into account at all, or is not taken into account. And this, as we know, is a prerequisite for violation of discipline and reduces the quality of service. To maintain the necessary collective mood, the commander needs to know the peculiarities of the origin, functioning and development of the collective mood.

The commander, knowing the peculiarities of the collective mood, can in some cases preserve and support the spontaneous impulse and enthusiasm, in others - cause a rise in mood, and in others - prevent the emergence of negative collective moods by overcoming the causes of their appearance.

Collective moods and collective opinions are closely intertwined and interconnected with intra-collective traditions in the military collective. Social and psychological phenomena that arise on the basis of communication and mutual relations between people are often recorded in customs and traditions.

A custom is an established norm of behavior of people in a team. Customs that have special meaning for a given group and are passed on from generation to generation are called traditions.

Any society is characterized by a living connection between generations. Each older generation leaves behind all the material and spiritual values it created, the achievements of science, culture, established customs and moral standards. Subsequent generations do not assimilate this heritage mechanically, but process it in accordance with their worldview, discarding what contradicts their worldview.

Certain relationships in a team, moods, way of life and activities, leadership style, and people’s behavior may be traditional; Such actions and relationships, having become traditional, become a collective need.

The presence of intra-collective traditions and their observance inevitably give rise to internal confrontations: expectation and empathy, mutual closeness, certain attitudes towards various actions and deeds of military personnel. These relationships are included in general structure social relations of the team, deepen personal character, and therefore contributes to team unity.

Traditions contribute to the continuity of the spiritual appearance and mental make-up of people, help foster collectivism, respect for the experience of older generations, and encourage social activity.

The set of traditions is essential element intra-collective socio-psychological atmosphere in which the military personnel constantly resides.

Traditions, like other psychological phenomena of a group, arise and manifest themselves on different scales and in different living conditions. They can be an element of the psychology of an entire people, a nation, a class or social stratum, a specific group of people, a certain team. National, class, and national traditions permeate each specific community (group, collective). Along with the general ones, within each collective, many specific intra-collective traditions arise, grow stronger and exist, which are characteristic only of this collective. These traditions have a great influence on the formation of the personality of the serviceman and the unit as a whole.

The totality of various traditions of a military unit represents the most important element of the intra-collective socio-psychological atmosphere in which the warrior’s personality constantly finds itself and which it constantly assimilates.

Traditions are numerous and varied. They are divided conditionally on the following grounds:

2. By spheres of manifestation: moral, legal, artistic, religious.

3. By belonging to various communities: national, national, class, territorial, professional, age, mixed, intra-collective.

In the life of internal troops units, the most durable and well-known traditions are combat traditions:

Pride in the service and military merits of the internal troops;

Pride in the success of one’s unit or unit;

Military friendship, collectivism;

High official vigilance;

Honesty and integrity in performing service and combat missions;

Humanism;

High discipline and diligence.

The best traditions of the internal troops are constantly

live, develop, multiply.

In the teams of internal troops units great value has the popularization of military traditions:

1) service - to achieve complete interchangeability (mastery of several specialties), fight for excellent performance in the service, etc.;

2) sports - to achieve the best sports performance among divisions and individuals

military personnel, comply with standards and sports categories;

3) everyday - honoring soldiers and their parents on significant days for them, maintaining contact with soldiers transferred to the reserve, etc.

Life shows that the educational capabilities of a team are directly dependent on the number of positive traditions. Constant public assessment of positive traditions and sentiments contributes to their consolidation in the military team.

Good traditions that enhance the empathy of people in a team are various rituals, the solemn taking of the Oath, drill reviews, checks and reviews of equipment, the ceremonial presentation of weapons, celebrations, honoring excellent service personnel, assignments to posts, etc. Military rituals are always accompanied by a strong emotional overtones, affect the best human feelings, evoke a feeling of pride for the Motherland, the internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Armed Forces, military personnel, and a large number of people, both military personnel and guests, participate in them.

But if you don’t pay attention to this, then psychological mechanism traditions can work in a negative way. Sometimes negative traditions that have developed in a unit can negatively affect the relationships between military personnel of different service periods and different nationalities.

In order to successfully combat such negative traditions, the commander needs to identify individuals or microgroups who are their sources, trying to sow discontent, acting consciously or unconsciously in the role of “collective opinion,” and timely isolate them (morally and psychologically) in the team.

Practice shows that administrative measures and prohibitions do not always eliminate the power of harmful traditions. The great Soviet teacher A.S. Makarenko go-

believed that a negative tradition cannot be destroyed simply by order, it must be supplanted by a new tradition, stronger and more useful. Such work requires great patience and deep thought from the unit commander.

Great attention is paid to the formation and maintenance of the best traditions and collective mood in the team by the personal example of the commander’s behavior. The commander of a unit must always be an example of an officer of internal troops, must be self-confident, cheerful, be able to not succumb to negative moods, promptly and constructively resolve conflicts that arise in the unit, carry out purposeful and constant work to form a collective opinion, collective mood, intra-collective traditions in the entrusted him unit.

Thus, by popularizing the best traditions of the unit and unit, the commander facilitates the statutory and social regulation of the life of military personnel, promotes the organization of good rest, and the development of the best moral and combat qualities of military personnel. By carefully analyzing the elements of negative habits and non-statutory customs, the officer does not allow them to be introduced into the traditions of the unit. Together with the activists, he examines every manifestation of prejudice or superstition, reacts to fashion among personnel and wages a tactful but uncompromising fight against everything that interferes with team unity and maintaining a good socio-psychological climate.

Managing collective opinion and mood, the ability to create traditions in a unit, unity of thoughts and feelings, eliminating emotional contradictions, forming collective demands - these are the areas that contribute to the unity of personnel and increasing the combat readiness of the unit, part of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

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When receiving a referral for analysis, think about

What will you do if the result is:

a) positive

b) negative.

If the answers coincide, the need

will disappear in the analysis.

(Cochrane)

The collective opinion is

In reality, not all of your thoughts are yours. To be honest, you generally have very few thoughts of your own, but on the contrary, a lot of other people’s.

Collective or public opinion is the opinion of the majority. Until people learned to manipulate it and turned it into an instrument of power, it was very useful in the process of evolution. Currently, the collective opinion contains many false judgments.

What is collective opinion? This is magic for the initiated! Anyone who understands how public opinion works gets the helm of control and power into their hands.

Collective opinion is a powerful tool, the power of which is welcomed by any democratic institution, from a public organization to the country as a whole. Collective opinion changes the power and course of countries, throws people into poverty or raises them above the whole world, educates the spirit or takes away the will.

Otherwise, collective opinion is called the opinion of the majority or public opinion, or the opinion of the masses, the opinion of the work collective. But no matter what they call it, they always talk about it as a certain truth and law, actions against which are unacceptable and can undermine the immutable and fundamental laws of society.

Collective opinion represents a set of individual judgments of the majority of personnel. It expresses the position, views, beliefs, and value orientations of military personnel.

Opinion military collective takes shape and develops under the determining influence of ideology and morality, the requirements of the military oath and regulations, orders and instructions of commanders (chiefs), decisions of meetings, traditions and customs.

It is known that collective opinion, expressing the mind, will and feelings of the majority, causes a person to strive for self-improvement. Power and experience, respect and trust make authoritative and every word of the commander, the educational officer, is impressive, and the separation from reality, idle talk, and uncertainty cause mistrust to the commander.

A decisive prerequisite for the stability of collective opinion are:

Faith in the commander and your weapon;

Ideological conviction and sense of patriotism;

Close spiritual contact with a person, the ability to understand his thoughts and interests is a reliable guarantee of mutual respect, unity of judgment and maintaining a healthy moral and psychological atmosphere in the team.

Collective opinion as a socio-psychological process has three conditional stages of development.

On the first stage, warriors perceive, experience and evaluate an action or event, each of them has their own subjective assessment and individual opinion-judgment. The main thing at the first stage is to prevent the emergence of immature views. The officer is assisted in this by activists, warrant officers, and sergeants, who, constantly being among their colleagues, quickly react to the news and give it the correct assessment.

On the second At the stage of forming a common opinion, warriors exchange thoughts and assessments. This stage can take place either calmly or in disputes, depending on how much the information affects the interests of each individual. At this stage, it is more difficult for an officer to change the incorrect judgments of individual military personnel, since individual-group opinion has a certain inertia, one gets used to it.

On the third The stage of development of a common opinion involves groups of warriors who have different knowledge, beliefs, interests, and experience.

If military personnel correctly and deeply understand the essence of the ongoing processes, argue not for the sake of their own interests, but in the name of the highest interests of the command, then the team is born competent general opinion.

Sometimes it is enough not to focus on false information for it to lose its meaning and significance.

It’s not easy to manage group opinions, and it’s even harder to develop fundamental criticism. The experience of working to form a mature collective opinion shows that it is necessary to criticize, first of all, not minor mistakes and individual statements, but serious violations of moral norms, military discipline, and the negative orientation of the individual.

Publicity in the military collective it helps to increase the efficiency of management, accumulates the diversity of interests of military personnel, and is an effective way to strengthen internationalism and instill patriotism.

Important place allocated to individual and group conversations.

Individual conversation very carefully prepared in advance. Need to collect required material, containing information about the upcoming conversation and about the warrior invited to an individual conversation. It is very important to know what you need to achieve in the upcoming conversation. The general outline of the conversation may contain the main steps.

First step- will adapt to the consciousness of the warrior, having access to it, using rapport, pacing and sensory experience.

Second step- advancement of the warrior’s consciousness from the current state to the desired one.

Third step- adjusting the warrior’s consciousness to a new (desired) state.

The new state should:

Have a positive result;

To dominate sensory experience in the interests of the individual and the cause:

Initiated and supported by the warrior himself;

Exist while maintaining positive side effects in a different situation.

The collective conversation is also very carefully prepared in advance. At the same time we're talking about about preliminary study, and sometimes the formation of a collective opinion, about preliminary work with unit commanders, with leaders of microgroups, etc.

A collective conversation begins with the formation of an emotional upsurge among listeners and the communication of undeniable information to them. Each statement must be confirmed by the agreement of the listeners (“Yes!”). (Adjustment to the collective consciousness of the group is underway).

Then you need to try to somehow put the listeners into a trance, i.e. turn everyone to their own inner experience. (Introduce best picture states: – memory of the Motherland; - successful solution of current problems; - appeal to one’s own conscience, honor, etc.).

A common underlying symptom of this condition may be the “unfocused” gaze of most listeners.

After this, it is necessary to begin the formation of beliefs, which should take the form of short slogans with an active focus.

In conclusion, it is necessary to reinforce the slogans in a relaxed atmosphere, but in such a way that listeners do not suspect that they are repeating phrases that have already been said.

The officer carefully analyzes the results of group and individual interviews and draws a conclusion. Sometimes collective opinion is recorded in the form of decisions made at meetings.

In some cases, to analyze collective opinion, they use written questionnaires and personal interviews. They may contain questions that reveal information about an individual or a team, facts of behavior in the past and present, an assessment of events or attitudes towards an individual soldier, a group of fellow countrymen, etc. Experiments show that in the process of developing a collective opinion, individual opinions are consolidated into group. This is manifested in the fact that the coefficient of agreement increases after discussing the issue in groups that have reached a high level of development.

Thus , collective opinion management achieves its goal if the following conditions are met:

Constant and reliable communication with personnel;

Regular information about current events;

Preliminary work to prepare the team for a certain impact public opinion;

Development of transparency and culture of discussion;

Skillful selection of the most appropriate forms of influencing the consciousness and feelings of soldiers - meetings, printing, group and individual conversations;

Providing truthful information to personnel about who serves and how, performs their duties, relates to comrades and commanders;

Communicating to the team its own opinion on the most important issues service and everyday life, its importance for strengthening discipline and increasing combat readiness;

Ensuring pedagogical tact and sensitivity in working with military personnel who have poor knowledge of the Kazakh (Russian) language and blindly follow national customs;

Maintaining statutory relationships and actively combating deviations from the requirements of military regulations, orders and instructions of the commander.

Knowledge of collective opinion gives the commander the moral right to give orders to the personnel of the unit and guarantee their implementation.

Conclusion on the second question: Thus, high level unity of action is ensured by everyone’s desire for collective success (collectivist motivation), as well as the ability of each warrior to build his actions taking into account the actions and needs of his comrades. Skills and abilities of interaction are based, in turn, on the individual combat prowess of each warrior, on his knowledge of his duties, weapons and military equipment and the ability to use them in battle.

Collective opinion

Intensive consultations with the heads of other socialist countries regarding Czechoslovakia began at the beginning of 1968. The first tangible result was an agreement on a meeting in Dresden. At this meeting, in addition to delegations from the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Communist Party of China, representatives of the communist parties of the GDR and Poland were to be present. Hungary and Bulgaria.

The meeting of representatives of the communist parties of six socialist countries in Dresden on March 23 began with the fact that the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were told that “the fraternal communist parties do not understand the concept of their activities.” The Prague delegation was criticized for the fact that “the press, radio and television were out of control”; that as a result of the attacks of the means mass media“well-tested, struggle-hardened cadres of the party and state” are removed from their posts; that 80% of those fired were people who studied in Moscow; that mass resignations of district and regional committee secretaries began. It was pointed out that the army had begun to decompose, “drawn into rallies instead of service.” However, it was not possible to achieve complete unity, not in words, but in deeds, in condemning the Czechoslovak leadership in Dresden. Some of the meeting participants, primarily the Hungarian leader J. Kadar, had a different opinion. Moreover, on April 18, Kadar cautiously, but expressed approval of a number of actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

The results of the Dresden meeting were discussed and approved by the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, held in Moscow on April 9-10. The main refrain of the speeches was: “We will not give up socialist Czechoslovakia.”

After the Dresden meeting, there was a temporary lull in relations between the conflicting parties. TASS, without any comments, reprinted fragments of A. Dubcek’s speech at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The election of General L. Svoboda to the post of president of the country was generally received with approval. This eliminated the high probability of electing Smrkovski, a completely unacceptable figure for Moscow.

The "truce", however, was short-lived.

In the second half of April, demands for the first time appeared in the Czech press to cleanse the HRC of the “sullied” – those who were involved in the repressions of past years. The demands found support among a significant part of the public, primarily among young people and students. An attempt to carry out this campaign could lead to far-reaching consequences. In some cases, those who collaborated with the Soviet underground during the Second World War were also considered “tainted.”

The implementation of calls for purge could blow up the entire political system of the country, directly threatening almost all representatives of the party and state elite.

Indicative in this sense was the speech of the writers E. Goldstücker, chairman of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, and J. Prochazka, which took place on April 26, 1968 in Prague, at the House of the Czechoslovak Army.

They sharply criticized the entire path of development of Czechoslovakia after February 1948, pointing out that as a result of the events of 1968, prerequisites appeared in the country for the creation of a new social system democratic socialism. The Soviet Union, according to Goldstucker, was a “classic country of dictatorship.”

Goldstücker's theses were developed by Prochaska. Commenting on the recent suicide of General Janko, one of those responsible for political repression early 50s, the writer stated that he “acted like honest man", adding: "But I do not recommend that the entire General Staff exchange fire."

The Czechoslovak leadership was invited to Moscow for explanations.

On May 4, A. Dubcek, O. Chernik, I. Smrkovsky and V. Bilyak arrived in Moscow. From the Soviet side, the meeting was attended by L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, N.V. Podgorny, K.F. Katushev and K.V. Rusakov. The conversation lasted a long time - more than nine hours - and caused undisguised irritation in the Kremlin.

At a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on May 6, Brezhnev, commenting on the results of the meeting, said: “When you remember all the stages of relations after the first conversation with Comrade Dubcek, in particular, my conversation in Prague, and subsequent conversations, you get the impression that he is deliberately speaking one thing, but does something completely different, although he speaks wobblingly and vaguely.” As an example, Brezhnev cited Dubcek’s assurances to preserve personnel. However, according to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee replaced all cadres from bottom to top. Dubcek actually “decapitated the party.” Brezhnev spoke exceptionally harshly about the “Program of Action”: “It seems to me that we are united in the fact that this is a bad program that opens up opportunities for the restoration of capitalism in Czechoslovakia, albeit veiled by various phraseology. This is an expression of the petty-bourgeois element." Smrkovsky, at a meeting with the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee, according to Brezhnev, spoke little. The main point of his speech was the condemnation of previous repressions. During the disputes that arose between the Czech and Soviet sides, Smrkovsky gave Brezhnev, who saw him for the first time, the impression of a strong man and an integral personality. However, according to Brezhnev, he did not see any concern or anxiety in Smrkovsky’s speech.

The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee gave Chernik's speech a low rating - in his words, it was confusing and contained unsupported promises. Brezhnev appreciated Bilyak’s position most of all. In him “one could really feel anxiety about the state of affairs, about the development of events. He, for example, said that events were developing in such a direction that it threatened the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the socialist gains, that all non-communist parties had raised their heads.”

Brezhnev’s conclusion was as follows: “Today at the Military Council we considered issues that we have already discussed specific plans about our practical measures in connection with the current situation. Our first step was: we informed them of the proposal to send 20-25 of our marshals and generals, led by Marshal Konev and Moskalenko, to celebrate Victory Day... We also discussed a number of other measures, which I will talk about a little later.”

Kosygin brought a new, even harsher tone to the discussion. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, he said, is preparing rehabilitation, “they are thinking of playing it up, believing that Gottwald and Zapotocki have blood on their hands and that they acted together with Soviet Union. Against this background, they are thinking of organizing a new party, in fact, a bourgeois party and bourgeois order.” According to Kosygin, requests from the Czechoslovak side for a loan of 500 million rubles. gold are inherently provocative in nature: “They know that we will refuse this, that we will not give this loan on the terms they propose - and they also want to play on this.”

The May 1968 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, which Moscow was counting on, did not bring any changes in the balance of political forces and did not ensure the defeat of the reformers.

On June 4, a message was received through diplomatic channels in Moscow about a meeting between the Soviet ambassador and Bilyak. This time he described in detail the situation in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, paying special attention to the so-called “Prague center”, which, according to him, included Szyk, the first secretary of the South Moravian regional committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia J. Spacek, Cisarz, Kriegel and the Minister of Internal Affairs J. Pavel. They were joined by the head of the organizational and political department of the Central Committee, F. Kolář, and the head of the department of administrative and state bodies, V. Prhlik. These people, Bilyak claimed, hold meetings in the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in Cisarzh’s office. “Prague Center” is trying to operate in Prague districts, discrediting Dubcek. Biljak also noted that Dubcek has up to 10 thousand of the most dedicated soldiers and officers as an “operational force”, who, if necessary, will be immediately put on alert.”

Meanwhile, relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia continued to deteriorate and gradually reached a critical point. The situation became comparable to the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture of 1948. However, Moscow still hoped that the next multilateral negotiations could still rectify the situation.

But in what followed between L.I. In a telephone conversation between Brezhnev and A. Dubcek, it became clear that the Czechs were refusing a joint meeting of representatives of six communist parties in Warsaw. It was an outright demarche.

Brezhnev attacked Dubcek with accusations, saying that the refusal to meet opens a new confrontational stage in relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Dubcek made weak excuses, admitting that the press did make some mistakes, in particular anti-Soviet attacks.

The “Letter of Five,” as it was called in Prague, to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which contained an invitation to Czechoslovak leaders to Warsaw, was still regarded in Czechoslovakia as unacceptable interference in internal affairs.

During the Warsaw meeting (in the absence of the Czechoslovak delegation), a message was developed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The document stated that “in view of the counter-revolutionary offensive unfolding in Czechoslovakia, the fraternal parties urgently demand that the Czechoslovak leadership urgently take energetic measures to repel the onslaught of the enemy, taking into account that the defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not a private matter of this country only, but the sacred duty of the entire socialist community "

The news from Prague was increasingly less encouraging. One of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia informed that the Soviet embassy and the villas where Soviet diplomats live were under surveillance and all their meetings were monitored.

In mid-July, a secret letter addressed to L.I. arrived from Prague through KGB channels. Brezhnev from candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China A. Kapek. It reported: “In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a group from the leadership of the party, represented by Smrkovsky, Kriegel, Spacek, Shimon, Cisarzh, Slavik, has taken control of all the media and is conducting anti-Soviet and anti-socialist work.” At the end of the letter, A. Kapek directly called: “I appeal to you, Comrade Brezhnev, with an appeal and request to provide fraternal assistance to our party and all our people in repelling those forces that pose a serious danger to the very fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia.” Socialist Republic» .

The letter was read at a meeting of the Politburo, but it was considered insufficient to make an important military-political decision. A few days later, through the same channels, another letter was sent to Brezhnev, now signed by five Czechoslovak leaders. The letter spoke about the emergence of the possibility of a “counter-revolutionary coup” in Czechoslovakia and contained a call for intervention in the Czechoslovak events. “In such a difficult situation, we turn to you, soviet communists, leading representatives of the CPSU and the USSR, with a request to provide us with effective support and assistance by all means that you have. Only with your help can Czechoslovakia be rescued from the imminent danger of counter-revolution. We are aware that for the CPSU and the USSR this last step to defend socialism in Czechoslovakia would not be easy.

Due to the complexity and danger of the development of the situation in our country, we ask you to keep this statement of ours as secret as possible, for this reason we will send it directly to you personally in Russian.”

On July 19, at the next meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, L.I. Brezhnev said that relations with Czechoslovakia had reached new stage. Time, he said, “is not working in our favor, against us. Now in Prague they are waiting for the arrival of Ceausescu and Tito, there is talk about some kind of Danube agreement, a Danube meeting.” Brezhnev emphasized that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia received support in the European communist movement, and the Italian and French Communist Parties called for a European meeting where the actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Communist Party could be approved. This led to the conclusion: “Not only a new moment has arisen, but also new requirements for our actions. One question arises: have we exhausted everything from the arsenal of political influence, have we done everything before taking extreme measures? We also declared at the plenum that we would take all measures of political influence in our power. If this does not give the corresponding effect, only then will we take extreme measures.”

With this cautious, restrained statement, Brezhnev made it clear that at this stage he still remains a supporter of political pressure on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Kosygin agreed with him, who believed that effective form exerting political pressure could become a bilateral meeting.

This position, however, did not find support among the majority of Politburo members. Naturally, the object of criticism was not Brezhnev, but Kosygin. Andropov, Ustinov, Mazurov, Kapitonov - they all believed that the time had come for tough measures. Ultimately, the Politburo came to a compromise decision: to consider the meeting with the Czechoslovak leaders as the last political measure of influence.

The policy of pressure on Prague was greatly facilitated by the relatively neutral attitude of international public opinion towards what was happening in Czechoslovakia.

The meeting with US Secretary of State D. Rusk, which took place on July 22, showed that the Americans do not want to interfere in the conflict. Rusk stated: “The US Government strives to be very restrained in its comments in connection with events in Czechoslovakia. We definitely do not want to be in any way involved or involved in these events." This was a signal for Moscow. It became clear to the political leadership of the USSR: the implementation of “extreme measures” would not lead to active opposition from the United States.

According to the Politburo decisions of July 19 and 22, hasty practical development of these “extreme measures” began. On July 20, the first, and on July 26, the second edition of the Declaration on behalf of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Revolutionary Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on internal and foreign policy, as well as “Appeals to the citizens of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, to the Czechoslovak army.” These documents should have been made public after the troops of the USSR and other countries Warsaw Pact will enter Czechoslovakia. On July 26-27, at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, all necessary documents were fully worked out, including the statement “To to the Soviet people" The hour of decision was inexorably approaching.

The last Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations on July 29 – August 1, 1968 took place with the participation of almost the entire composition of both the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. They took place in Cierna nad Tisou. The absence of the heads of the most important Soviet departments at the negotiations: Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and KGB Chairman Yu.V. Andropov - clearly indicated the desire of the participants to present the discussion as a purely party matter.

The meeting, however, could hardly be called negotiations in the strict sense of the word. In Moscow, it was conceived rather as a form of massive pressure; the bet was placed on finally forcing Prague to make concessions and change its position.

On the eve of the negotiations, the Politburo received almost simultaneously messages from N. Ceausescu, I. Tito and 18 European communist parties, which contained a request (a veiled warning) not to put too much pressure on the leadership of Czechoslovakia. The delegations were placed camping - in two trains in the middle of tobacco plantations near the border strip, which was supposed to indicate the emergency of what was happening and put psychological pressure on the Prague leaders.

The negotiations opened with a four-hour speech by Brezhnev, in which he mixed quotes from the Czechoslovak press with accusations of pandering to Western imperialism and the desire to “push through a counter-revolution.” If the goal was to achieve mutual understanding, this performance could not be considered successful.

It caused displeasure from the very beginning opposite side. The event was in jeopardy.

The Kremlin leaders did not take into account the mentality of the Czechs and Slovaks. They did not expect that unceremonious pressure would only revive a sense of unity in the Prague leadership. In such a situation, even Bilyak and Indra and their supporters considered it prudent to join the common camp.

During the negotiations, P.E. behaved most aggressively. Rustle. He raised the question of the status and position of the Ukrainian national minority in Slovakia. Having started to find out who was “right” in the Czechoslovak leadership, Shelest insulted Kriegel, calling him a “Galician Jew.” The attack aggravated the situation to the limit. Kosygin was forced to go to the train of the Czechoslovak delegation and apologize for Shelest, who “went too far.”

After the break, the parties agreed to continue exchanging views in groups.

Ultimately, the Czechoslovak leadership pledged to curb the press, confirmed its commitment to socialism and its country's loyalty to its obligations under the Warsaw Pact Organization. However, the Prague leadership, led by Dubcek, was asked to once again express its position at a multilateral forum in Bratislava. The delegation of the Communist Party of Human Rights did not hide its surprise: why gather again? But she was forced to agree on the condition that the meeting would take place on the territory of Czechoslovakia and would not interfere in internal affairs.

In fact, the meeting left a deeply negative impression on both sides.

V.A., who was present at the negotiations in Chierna Aleksandrov believed that the constant “sources of escalating mistrust” during the frank discussion were two Czechoslovak leaders - the chairman of the National Assembly I. Smrkovsky and the head of the National Front F. Kriegel, “the first - due to his ambitions, claims to the role of the main tribune, the second - in the power of mind-blowing political infantilism. As soon as Dubcek or Chernik said some friendly phrase towards the USSR, both “enfant terrible” hastened to refute what was said in their circle: they say, don’t believe it, in fact “Sasha” thought differently. In other cases, such discord would not have meant anything, but we were talking about relationships that were called “brotherly,” and here trust or the lack thereof acquired decisive significance.”

In turn, after returning from Cierna nad Tisou, F. Kriegel said: “After Cierna I cannot sleep. I found it incredible low level these people who have never read a single book by Marx or Lenin in their lives. When I think that the fate of the world depends on them, I cannot sleep."

After the negotiations, Prime Minister O. Chernik called C. Cisarz, the only member of the top party leadership remaining in Prague, and implored him to try to avoid the appearance in the press immediately before the new meeting of the leaders of the bloc of harsh publications that could irritate Moscow.

However, the Czechoslovak press was already beyond the reach of party control. One of the issues of the mass publication Literary Lists came out with a caricature of W. Ulbricht. The agreements reached were not respected.

The last, increasingly elusive hope remained the Bratislava meeting. There was a lot of handshaking, kissing and flowers at the meeting in Bratislava. It was reminiscent of a meeting of old friends, not burdened by disagreements and disputes, delighted by the opportunity to see each other after separation. Delegations to in full force were seated in a large hall. A lively discussion began that threatened to drag on indefinitely.

The collective discussion was soon stopped by Brezhnev. He suggested that only the first secretaries stay, adding: “Here, Kosygin will also be with me.” Party leaders locked themselves in a separate room and began to read the text of the draft joint statement, which was prepared by the Soviet working group in a saloon car on the way from Cierna to Bratislava. None of the assistants and persons who were not members of the management were allowed to do this work. Corrections to the project were made directly by Brezhnev, who gave the text sheet by sheet to his assistant G.E. Tsukanov is the only person who has received the right to enter the negotiation room.

In the next room, everyone else was waiting - lower-ranking leaders, experts, accompanying persons.

The statement of the six fraternal communist parties, adopted in Bratislava, did not contain a statement about the onset of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. The socialist achievements of the past were spoken of in the most general terms; on compliance with the general laws of socialist construction in accordance with the documents of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, including the leading role of the party, the principle of democratic centralism, and the irreconcilable struggle against bourgeois ideology; about close ties within the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact; about fraternal mutual assistance and solidarity.

But in the phrases, which at first glance seemed like boilerplate statements from newspaper editorials, there was a far from harmless meaning hidden.

The main point of the Bratislava statement was the provision on defending the gains of socialism as the common international duty of all socialist countries. This was a rather vague thesis, allowing for different interpretations. Among other things, it assumed the use, if necessary, of collective (including military) measures against the violating country. Each side, leaving the meeting, considered itself a winner. Dubcek viewed the results of the meeting in Bratislava as “the legalization of the Czechoslovak path to socialism.”

But he was wrong. Having recognized the defense of socialism as a matter for the entire socialist community and thereby the right of “fraternal” parties to discuss and, on occasion, to intervene in the internal problems of a sovereign country, Dubcek thereby allowed for the possibility of replacing interstate relations with interparty ones.

Western journalists who observed the meeting noted an incomprehensible timidity in Brezhnev's behavior and the angry appearance of Ulbricht and Gomulka.

Immediately after the Bratislava meeting, a somewhat reassured Brezhnev went on vacation. He was replaced in the CPSU Central Committee by A.P. Kirilenko, who was instructed to transmit generalized information and assessments of the situation in Czechoslovakia to Crimea, where the Secretary General was located.

In fact, the information coming to Crimea from Moscow was of secondary importance for Brezhnev. The main channel of information, which he completely trusted, was the Yalta-Prague telephone cable, conversations with the Soviet embassy, which went on continuously, several times a day. Through this channel, representatives of the “healthy forces” in the Czechoslovak leadership contacted Brezhnev. Their live speech, apparently, was more convincing than the corresponding written presentation in the reports of Ambassador Chervonenko.

The main leitmotif of the conversations was the same: Dubcek’s team interprets the results of the Bratislava meeting completely differently than the leaders of other communist parties.

Soon after the Bratislava meeting, coded messages about meetings of party activists in Prague districts were placed on Brezhnev’s desk, at which F. Kriegel and I. Smrkovsky shared their impressions of how they “deceived the Russians” and noted that “everyone will do it their own way.”

Brezhnev finally formed the conviction: further negotiations with the Czechoslovak reformers are useless; in the near future they will inevitably be swept away by a second, more radical wave, which will lead to the restoration of the bourgeois order in Czechoslovakia.

The discord and clash of ambitions in the ranks of the Czechoslovak reformers allowed Moscow to actively search for a replacement for Dubcek - either offering the post of first secretary to E. Erban, who was not in the forefront, which he wisely refused, or hatching plans to create a puppet “workers’ and peasants’ government.” According to Mlynarzh, the Kremlin’s search for a 100% reliable candidate was affected by the “Russian tradition of relying on one person, invested with absolute trust,” and the inability to take into account, much less cooperate, with various political forces or unspoken factions of one party.

On August 9, in a telephone conversation with Dubcek, Brezhnev expressed his complaints about the actual refusal of the Czechoslovak side to fulfill previous agreements.

“One gets the impression,” Brezhnev said, “that no conclusions have been drawn from the meetings. The commitments that you and I made in Cierna nad Tisou are not being fulfilled.” He then spoke of measures to take over the media and stop the activities of the Social Democratic Party and clubs.

On August 13 a new telephone conversation with Dubcek. Brezhnev demanded an explanation for anti-Soviet attacks in the Czechoslovak press. Brezhnev also raised two other problems: the promised changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in the party leadership. In this difficult emotional conversation with a lot of mutual reproaches, Brezhnev voiced accusations of deception and refusal of accepted obligations. In turn, Dubcek constantly referred to changed circumstances and the impossibility of resolving the issues raised at the Presidium. It is still unclear, however, what Dubcek meant by “changed circumstances.” Apparently, control over the situation really slipped out of his not very firm hands.

The conclusions made in Moscow after Brezhnev’s conversation with Dubcek on August 13 became decisive. No one doubted or dared to doubt the need for a military invasion of Czechoslovakia.

On August 16, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee approved the text of Brezhnev’s message to Dubchek. On two pages it listed, point by point, the obligations violated by the Czechoslovak leadership.

The next day, August 17, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee was chaired by Brezhnev himself. This meeting began the final stage of preparation for the invasion. It was decided to convene on August 18 a meeting of the leaders of the countries - members of the Warsaw Pact, whose troops were involved in military operation in Czechoslovakia.

Depending on the degree of unity and agreement in the dynamics of public opinion of a military collective, its three main stages are distinguished: diffuse, polarized and unified collective opinion.

Diffuse opinion is a difference in views and judgments. Warriors have contradictory, discordant positions; some of them find it difficult to determine their point of view, cannot objectively evaluate the judgments of their comrades and consciously join any position.

A polarized opinion occurs if the leading points of view have already been determined, as a result of which personnel divided into two or three groups, each of which has its own position and defends it. This condition can have negative consequences and conflict.

A single collective opinion is characterized by maximum agreement and the presence of one, common, consciously and sincerely shared position by all.

The process of collective opinion formation can be observed in various forms communication between soldiers: during a meeting, in a friendly conversation during rest, when discussing films, books, and press materials. By participating in these forms of communication, observing how agreement is reached on positions and views on issues of concern to personnel, how differences are overcome, commanders draw conclusions about the significant moral and psychological characteristics of the team.

In interaction with the team, the individual appears as a self-regulating system in the social environment. From this point of view, collective opinion can be considered as a feedback channel, as the most important source of socio-psychological information about the immediate environment for the individual. It informs a person about the reaction to his actions and actions on the part of other people and, thus, contributes to making adequate decisions. Moreover, the group itself carries out certain social sanctions against the individual. It continuously compares the behavior of each of its members with the system of norms that exists within this group, and the results are expressed in the characteristics of the attitude towards this person in the team, which can reflect approval and praise or, conversely, condemnation.

It should be noted that collective opinion is not only a multifaceted phenomenon, but also a very dynamic one. In the dynamics of the formation and development of public opinion, a number of degrees are distinguished.

The formation of correct public opinion is facilitated by positive traditions and sentiments existing in the military collective.