In 1992, the Russian Federation underwent many economic changes. They radically changed the country. A transition was made from a planned economy to a market economy. Economists, historians and politicians differ in their assessments of these reforms. What was the meaning of the transformations, how people reacted to them and why this particular path was chosen, experts discussed.

Questions:

What was the situation in the country before the reforms?

Evgeniy Yasin

In the economic sphere, we were approaching collapse, which was caused by falling oil prices, budget imbalances, the inability to purchase important goods for us abroad, and the deterioration of the financial situation of workers. The political side was also extremely difficult. I suspect that since September 1990, Gorbachev’s closest associates in his party work nominated certain requirements, which he first performed, and then did not want to.

Alexander Rutskoy

The country was in a state economic crisis. A shallow, non-protracted crisis. If we approach the topic of overcoming the crisis using the works of John Case, a supporter of a managerial market economy, then we will definitely get a positive result. I don’t know what motivated Mr. Gaidar when he referred to Friedman, but Gaidar’s reforms have nothing in common with Friedman’s theory. This is just sheer stupidity, which ultimately led the country to default.

Were the reforms well thought out?

Evgeniy Yasin

When you start reforms, talking about whether they are thought out and so on is empty talk, because collectively, in interconnection, you can make decisions that form a certain core - the beginning of the reform. And then they look at the circumstances and take measures that will be forced by circumstances. Gaidar had a well-thought-out reform program. At first, its principled position was to liberalize prices, which is what he did. From my point of view it was completely the right decision, because it opened up the possibility of solving the many problems that lurked in the planned economy. The second core is privatization. It was more long-term. This is not so much an administrative move, but an institutional act that lies in changing the behavior of the population.

Alexander Rutskoy

No, they were done spontaneously. You know, the same John Case, to whom I just referred, has a wonderful saying: the transition to new forms of economic relations through price liberalization is the path to poverty. Which, in fact, was done by Gaidar.

Was there an alternative to these reforms?

Evgeniy Yasin

I believe that there may be an alternative. There were two options - either shock therapy, that is, the most hard and short jerk, or you take slow actions that stretch. The Ryzhkov government used the second option. In the situation in which Russia found itself, extending reforms was difficult. Each step caused resistance and the need for some solutions that would complement or somehow correct what you had done. This path has been used before, but did not lead to the desired result.

Alexander Rutskoy

Of course there was. There was an alternative proposal from Yavlinsky, there was an alternative proposal from Abalkin, and there was a draft proposal from Glazyev. They differed from Gaidar’s ideas in that the proposals were of a priority and consistency nature, without inventing any inventions. It was impossible to start with price liberalization, that's it. Secondly, the very idea of ​​privatization is complete stupidity. As a result, we see who owns the country’s national treasure today. Open Forbes magazine and look at the biographies of these billionaires, then you will understand. Dozens of generations created the country's national treasure, and it was dispersed through loans-for-shares auctions for almost nothing. Just recently they showed an interview with Mr. Chubais himself, where he says: “We didn’t care how much they would pay for the enterprises, for the energy system, we were interested in one thing - driving the last nail into the lid of communism.” Privatization was built on these principles.

How did people perceive the reforms?

Evgeniy Yasin

Those citizens who lived in major cities and in some part of the average, they perceived it positively. As for villages, small towns and a certain part of the population of medium-sized ones, big cities, they expected something good, but prices rose sharply, financial policy. Many were unhappy.

Alexander Rutskoy

Gaidar also said something about this. When he was informed that the poverty of the population had reached such a climax that people were simply dying out, Mr. Gaidar replied that this natural selection. The whole country was brought not only to its knees, but in general uncomfortable position- on all fours. They didn't care about our country. Armed forces were destroyed, the military-industrial complex was plundered. Natural resources handed out left and right. Budget-generating enterprises were sold for next to nothing.

What was the situation in the country after the reforms?

Evgeniy Yasin

The main results of the reform were summed up in 1997. Important steps have been taken. On the one hand, this year we can observe financial stabilization. Please note that inflation in 1997 was 11% compared to 2500% in 1992. Financial stabilization, that is, the completion of the process of price liberalization and economic stabilization, was largely completed in 1997. Then 1998 came and we had the consequences of creating our own financial market, selling government securities. And then the crisis began, since there was no confidence in the new securities. The situation was unstable. One could conclude that the reforms were unsuccessful. But in fact, by the end of 1998, after the devaluation, it became clear that the economy was recovering. It was observed in 1999 and 2000. The revival subsequently showed that a market economy had begun to operate in Russia. Therefore, even then it was possible to draw conclusions that ultimately these reforms were successful.

Alexander Rutskoy

Everyone remembers the state the country was reduced to: shuttle traders and sports complexes became markets. Everyone was trading everywhere. Businesses were closing. No salary was paid. Pensions were not paid. What can you call this condition? Collapse. Not only economic, but also social. 5 years later, in 1998, we received the result of this incompetent leadership of the country and incompetent implementation of reforms - default. The most shameful phenomenon in the economy is when a country is unable to pay both internal and external debts.

· price release

· introduction of free trade

· entrepreneurship development

· privatization(transfer of state property into private hands - in the fall of 1992, citizens of the country received privatization checks-vouchers, which gave the right to purchase shares of enterprises; it was assumed that a wide layer of owners would be created in the country; citizens received little from voucher privatization, since in conditions of inflation the vouchers quickly depreciated; most of the vouchers were sold or invested in privatization funds, which soon ceased to exist; controlling blocks of shares were bought up by the administration of enterprises, which became their owners; carried out privatization- Chubais).

G Gaidar's reforms were carried out under the guidance of international financial organizations(International Monetary Fund-IMF). The government received loans if it complied with the recommendations of the IMF, this led to the formation of a huge public debt).

Results of Gaidar's reform:

• living standards have been set back 10-15 years
• most residents are below the poverty line
• depreciation of citizens' cash savings kept in the State Bank
• price liberalization caused a sharp rise in inflation
• over the year prices increased 26 times (officially)

March 31, 1992- representatives of the Russian Federation on the one hand and representatives of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation signed Federative Treaty , according to which the powers of the Federation and its subjects were delimited

December 1992 - Gaidar resigned and a new government was formed led by Chernomyrdin (head of government 1993-1998), which also followed the market course.

Against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating situation in the economy and social sphere, relations between the executive and legislative powers between the president on the one hand and the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies on the other have worsened. A dual power situation has developed in the country: people came out in opposition to Yeltsin Chairman of the Supreme Council Khasbulatov and Vice-President Rutskoy.

In the aggravated situation of dual power, Yeltsin issues a decree on September 21, 1993. announced the dissolution of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council. At the same time, on December 12, 1993. elections to the Federal Assembly were called. The Supreme Council did not recognize Yeltsin’s decree and the urgently assembled X Congress of People’s Deputies deprived Yeltsin of his presidential powers, transferring his responsibilities to Rutskoi. Deputies led by Khasbulatov and Rutsky decided to defend the White House.

October 3-4, 1993 - armed clashes near the White House and the television center building. The White House was captured. Opposition leaders were arrested.

At the beginning of 1992, the Russian leadership, headed by President B.N. Yeltsin, took real steps leading to a market economy. It was openly stated that the transition to a market economy requires a transition to a new model of social development.

The new government, headed by economist E.T. Gaidar, developed a program of radical economic reforms in the field of the national economy. The “shock therapy” measures envisaged by the program were aimed at a sharp transition of the economy to market methods of management. “Shock” measures should have been directed against the command-bureaucratic system, which is not capable of solving any positive problems, but has enormous potential and experience in suppressing everything progressive. The government was faced with the fundamental task of ensuring conditions for economic growth.

An important place in the economic reform program was occupied by the liberalization of prices - their release from state control. The state retained price regulation for only some goods and industrial products. Russian prices were brought too quickly to the world level, sales markets shrank significantly, price liberalization, and the transition to a strict financial policy should have caused a reduction in demand and production. However, during the first half of the year the rate of decline did not exceed 11-13% in most industries, but by the end of the year the demand for goods had practically disappeared. If previously some of them were competitive at least on price, then the rapid movement towards world prices has eliminated this advantage. Of the competitive industries, only those related to the export of oil, gas and partly the military-industrial complex remained.

Price liberalization caused a sharp rise in inflation. Over the year, consumer prices in Russia increased almost 26 times; The standard of living of the population has decreased. There was a reduction in investment, industrial programs and spending on social sphere. In 1992, the government of E. Gaidar, in order to fight inflation, took the path of deliberately not paying people wages. Cash savings stored in the State Bank depreciated and payments to citizens were stopped.

The main role in the process of transition to the market was assigned to the privatization of property. This radically distinguished the Russian government reform from the market reform of the perestroika period, which did not go beyond the framework of socialism. Its result should have been the transformation of the private sector into the predominant sector of the economy. Most enterprises have become private, joint-stock companies. However, significant stakes in large enterprises that play a leading role in the Russian economy remained in the hands of the state.

The economic reform program included major changes in agriculture. In particular, the emergence of new forms of management: open and closed joint-stock companies, limited liability partnerships, agricultural cooperatives.

The reforms carried out by Gaidar's government were sharply criticized by the Supreme Council, which sought a change in the Cabinet. President Boris Yeltsin strongly supported the government's course of economic reforms. However, under pressure from parliament and the consolidated opposition, by the summer of 1992, the government of E. Gaidar was forced to weaken its economic policy.

In order to prevent a decline in production, credit injections into the economy increased. Characteristic feature Economic reforms in Russia during this period included large-scale external loans; as a result, the operating conditions of the Russian economy were largely determined under the influence and direct participation of international financial organizations, primarily the World Bank and the IMF.

All efforts to strengthen financial system gave no results. Control over the economy was gradually lost. In December 1992, at the VII Congress of People's Deputies, a strong confrontation took place between the executive and representative authorities. As a result, the president weakened his position and E. Gaidar was forced to resign. However general course radical economic reforms remained, but the need to adjust the adopted reform course was widely recognized.

During the year of reform in Russia, the program outlined by the reformers was largely implemented: price liberalization, transition to strict financial and credit policies, introduction of a new tax system, changes in foreign economic and monetary policy, the expression of which was the free exchange rate of the ruble; development and start of implementation of the privatization program. However, the country's economy remained in a deep crisis, the manifestations of which were severe socio-economic consequences. The set goals were not fully achieved, and many of them were unrealistic.

As a result of the reform, conditions for effective competition did not develop in the country, a mechanism for market concentration and capital accumulation was not created, and the necessary set of incentives for effective use resources, a system of transparent rules of the economic game that are observed by all main participants has not been built. Within five years after the start of reforms, the economy experienced a decline in production. The government did not have a serious industrial policy and did not take steps to strengthen control over the public sector and did not sufficiently promote the development of private sector manufacturing.

The key result of the reform is a decrease in the standard of living of the population while simultaneously increasing social differentiation. The population experienced a severe blow due to the depreciation of their savings; the accelerated stratification that began inevitably turned out to be associated with a deterioration in the well-being and even impoverishment of certain groups of the population. The activities of the Gaidar government and the possibility of its influence on these processes were very modest, reduced to maneuvering, under pressure from parliament, trade unions and other forces, sometimes leading to unjustifiably cruel and unfair actions.

Nevertheless, a qualitative leap was made in social and economic life, a great historical step forward. Russia got rid of the elements of a totalitarian state: the general economic and personal dependence on the state was ended, the population received basic civil liberties and the foundations of a market economy. The reform gave citizens the right of economic self-determination - everyone is free to choose, based on their capabilities and desires: to become an entrepreneur or an employee in government agencies. It is freedom of choice that is the basis of personal freedom of people and the foundation for revealing the creative potential of an individual. Russia, having moved away from the principle of collectivism characteristic of Soviet society, in the first years of reforms gave preference to individualism, which determined the style of carrying out market reforms. In this choice, the pressure of external circumstances played a large role: the desire to quickly enter the world political, socio-economic and intellectual space prompted Russia to mechanically borrow the individualistic values ​​characteristic of developed Western society.

The failure of an attempt in historical short terms reform of the Soviet economy was caused by various factors and reasons. First of all, this does not take into account the realities of the Soviet economic system; setting abstract and largely unrealistic goals; as well as mistakes made in determining the content and sequence of economic and social policy measures. Reformers accepted the strategy that the IMF and the World Bank recommended to them, sometimes contradicting scientific recommendations, without really thinking about the extent to which it was suitable for Russia, taking into account its internal characteristics.

Political stability and political will to practically implement the main provisions of the economic reform program were not ensured. On the contrary, a confrontation broke out between the executive and legislative branches of government.

In many ways, the severe consequences of “shock therapy” were associated with a change in the main goal of the transformation. The main goal formulated earlier: to build civil society with an advanced economy based on a market system, was replaced by a different attitude: to implement such transformations that would undermine the socio-economic basis of possible relapses of the coup, the restoration of the communist system, and everything else, including civil society, market economy and everything else will work out later. Institutional reforms that were necessary to form a new economy capable of solving the problems facing the country were relegated to the background, which was a significant mistake when trying to implement liberal market reforms and ultimately led to their failure.

In November 1991, Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Government for Issues economic policy, the young economist Yegor Gaidar was appointed Minister of Economy and Finance. A close group of like-minded people formed in and around the government, which determined the course of the economic reforms being carried out. Later they began to call it “Gaidar’s team.” Gaidar economist minister chairman

In November 1991, the young economist Yegor Gaidar was appointed Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Government for Economic Policy and Minister of Economy and Finance. A close group of like-minded people formed in and around the government, which determined the course of the economic reforms being carried out. Later they began to call it “Gaidar’s team.” The core of the group was Alexander Shokhin, Petr Aven, Alexey Golovkov, Anatoly Chubais, Andrey Nechaev.

Gaidar entered the government when economic situation in the country was catastrophic. The budget deficit approached 30% of gross national product.

According to the data cited by the famous economist Evgeny Yasin in his book “ Russian economy: origins and panorama of market reforms,” the country experienced a reduction in food consumption by the population of almost all of its main types. Sales of sausage, which was a kind of symbol of prosperity in Soviet “developed socialism,” decreased by 24% in 1991 (from 1835 to 1393 thousand tons). The same figure for dairy products was 41% (from 21.5 to 12.7 million tons). If inventory in retail trade (at the end of the year) in days of turnover in 1985 was 93 days, then in 1990 this figure dropped to 44, and in 1991 - to 39 days.

The threat of famine loomed. By the end of 1991, the norms for food supply on cards in most regions were: sugar - 1 kg per person per month, meat products - 0.5 kg (with bones), animal butter - 0.2 kg. Some of the food came in the form humanitarian aid Western countries.

While the demand for food grains was 5 million tons per month in January 1992, there were 3 million tons of resources available. According to calculations by Roskhleboproduct, the grain import deficit amounted to 17.35 million tons. The situation was complicated by the fact that foreign exchange reserves were practically exhausted.

At the end of November 1991, Gaidar outlined a plan for the government's priority actions to stabilize economic situation: by releasing prices and wages while simultaneously pursuing a tough financial policy, stabilize the economy and restore its manageability on a market basis.

It was possible to begin carrying out the planned reforms only at the beginning of 1992.

From January 2, prices for the vast majority of goods (with the exception of bread, milk, alcohol, as well as utilities, transport and energy) were freed, and regulated ones were increased. A 28 percent value added tax has been introduced.

In addition to price liberalization, restrictions on imports were temporarily lifted and a zero import tariff was established. It was free imports that played a catalytic role in the development of private market trade in early 1992.

On January 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On Free Trade”. In accordance with this decree, enterprises, regardless of their form of ownership, and citizens were given the right to carry out trade, intermediary and purchasing activities without special permits. The exception was the trade in weapons, explosives, toxic and radioactive substances, drugs, medicines etc. All this led to a gradual saturation of the consumer market and an increase in inventory in retail trade.

At the same time, the country's economy has experienced such negative phenomena as a crisis of mutual non-payments by enterprises, a cash shortage that caused acute social tension, a decrease in tax revenues to the budget, and inflation.

In his speeches on the eve of liberalization, Gaidar spoke about the upcoming initial increase in prices by 200-300%. In fact, in January 1992 their growth compared to the previous month was 352%.

At the end of February, a new government program was announced; An official memorandum on the economic strategy of the Russian leadership was sent to the International Monetary Fund, which included tough measures to limit the budget deficit and free up energy prices.

In April 1992, at the VI Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, the government's economic policy was sharply criticized. On April 11, the Congress adopted a Resolution “On the Progress of Economic Reform in the Russian Federation”, in which: it noted a number of problems in the economy: a decline in production, the destruction of economic ties, a decline in the standard of living of the population, growing social tension, lack of cash; invited the President of Russia to make significant adjustments to the tactics and methods of implementing economic reform, taking into account comments and suggestions.

On April 13, Gaidar announced the resignation of the government, citing the fact that the resolution on the progress of reforms adopted at the Congress actually meant the disagreement of deputies with the economic course pursued by the government, and the additional budget expenditures it envisaged would not allow this course to be implemented without catastrophic consequences for the economy.

In this situation, a compromise was found: the congress adopted a Declaration of Support for Economic Reforms, in which the norms of the adopted Resolution on the progress of economic reform were softened.

After the VI Congress, the “Medium-Term Economic Concept of the Government” began to be developed, which provided for a reduction in the share of regulated prices and volumes of government procurement, the deployment of mass privatization, and bringing energy prices to global levels only within 2 years.

In fact, under pressure from deputies and directors of state-owned enterprises, financial policy has become less stringent. Combined with the significant seasonality of some economic processes for Russia, the unsettled financial relations with the CIS countries, which led to the simultaneous operation of many ruble issuing centers, and the lack of control of the government of the Central Bank of Russia, this led to the end of the period of relative financial stability and the development of a new inflationary spiral at the end of the summer - early autumn 1992.

In the fall, the government was again criticized with demands to restore price regulation and increase direct government intervention in events occurring in national economy processes.

In December 1992, the VII Congress of People's Deputies did not approve Yegor Gaidar as chairman of the Council of Ministers. After Viktor Chernomyrdin was confirmed as head of government, Gaidar was dismissed.

The activities of Yegor Gaidar are assessed ambiguously. On the one hand, his price reform in January 1992, which actually meant the abandonment of state regulation of prices for most goods, including essential goods, made it possible to almost instantly replenish store shelves that had been completely empty in previous years. However, while maintaining the population's income unchanged, this led to a catastrophic drop in living standards.

Reformers managed to reduce the deficit state budget and transfer the Soviet planned economy to a free market, but the side effects of their actions were hyperinflation and economic crisis.

Experts are still debating whether it was the reforms of Gaidar and his supporters or the decades of ineffective Soviet rule that preceded them that caused the collapse of the Russian economy in the early 1990s.

Additional sources

• 1. Economy transition period. Essays on the economic policy of post-communist Russia 1991-1997 / Ed. E. T. Gaidar, pp. 91-93.
• 2. E. Yasin. Russian economy: origins and panorama of market reforms. Course of lectures. - M.: State University Higher School of Economics, 2002.
• 3. Russian Economic Reform. Crossing the Threshold of Structural Change. World Bank, 1992.

In November 1991, after the August putsch and shortly before final collapse Soviet Union, the first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin was looking for a person who could, as part of the government of the country, carry out radical economic reforms, ending the planned economy. This person turned out to be economist Yegor Gaidar. In the year of the 25th anniversary of the start of the Yeltsin-Gaidar government, Lenta.ru recalls how the country was transferred to a market economy.

Prerequisites for reforms

By the end of 1991, the USSR had developed hopeless situation. The country, having just survived the August coup attempt (GKChP), was ready to disintegrate into union republics. The reason for this was, to a large extent, the economic situation that had developed in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s.

Low oil prices and outdated planned economic system, focused on the defense complex, contributed to the fact that by this time the state had become virtually bankrupt. Grain and other essential goods were partially purchased abroad, and there was a terrible shortage of consumer goods. The gold and foreign exchange reserves had practically dried up, the ruble was not backed by anything. And if in large cities the crisis was not felt so strongly, then in the outback a catastrophic situation developed.

The need for full-scale economic reforms, rather than gradual soft changes, was obvious at that time. Different teams of economists created their own vision future Russia. The most famous of the unrealized programs is the “500 days” of Grigory Yavlinsky and Stanislav Shatalin, the main feature of which was the gradual privatization of housing and small enterprises, plus the careful corporatization of large ones. All this had to happen within the framework of a single country - the USSR.

But the State Emergency Committee actually put an end to the new union agreement between Soviet republics. The last nail in the coffin Soviet Union was driven in on December 8, 1991, when the heads of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed an agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

In this situation, the first President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, relied on the radical reform program of the economist Yegor Gaidar. Gaidar, holding the position of First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, took up its implementation starting in January 1992.

Price liberalization

At the end of 1991, there were few people willing to head the Russian government, and therefore Boris Yeltsin decided to head the cabinet himself. He understood that there was practically no chance that the country's population would perceive the reforms positively, and, as an authoritative figure, he decided to take on the burden of responsibility. Despite the fact that the people adequately assessed the situation in the country's economy, the overwhelming majority were against price liberalization, and indeed anything that could hit an already almost empty pocket.

The start of the Gaidar program can be considered January 2, 1992, when prices were released (for all but some vital categories of products and services) and import duties were temporarily lifted - Russia stepped into a market economy. It is clear that the step did not fall on a hard surface - everyone was splashed. In just one month, prices on average increased 3.5 times. But, thanks to this and the abolition of duties, store shelves began to be filled with products, even if a very small part of the population could afford them.

Big flea market

The next milestone is the free trade decree adopted at the end of January. The country has turned into one big flea market. Everyone traded literally everything, setting prices for goods at their own discretion.

Fixed prices for socially significant categories of products (bread, milk and others) did not last long - they were released in May 1992. Collective farms did not want to sell grain for pennies - if everyone makes money, then why shouldn’t they?

There were no external sources of grain, gold and foreign exchange reserves were eaten up even before the collapse of the USSR, and there was nothing to buy it with. Western help was late - only in June 1992 did the IMF finally allocate a meager loan to Russia.

Inflation was gaining momentum in the country. This happened not so much because the state began to print money, but because the former Soviet republics, at that time located in the common ruble space, sought to issue as many Soviet rubles as possible, which flocked to Russia.

How to pay

Industry practically died under these conditions. The quality of Soviet goods left much to be desired, and few people bought them, but employees still had to be paid. Then the government decided to provide loans to enterprises to replenish working capital. People had money that they could spend, and this also spurred a rise in prices. However, the alternative was to leave people without the opportunity to purchase anything at all (but prices would not have soared so much).

It is interesting that at that time Goznak did not know to whom it was subordinate: Gaidar, the head of the Supreme Council Khasbulatov, or the Soviet Ministry of Finance in general, which ceased to exist, but by law had this department subordinate. Khasbulatov summoned Leonid Alekseev, the head of Goznak, and gave him a beating for allegedly printing papers, which is why there is inflation in the country. Because of this, the government's order to issue large denomination money for lending to enterprises was not completed on time, and many of their employees were left without salaries.

Of course, the population of the country could not be satisfied with this course of affairs. However, the worst did not happen: mass famine did not occur, electricity did not have to be turned off in the winter, and by spring the situation in the economy had at least stabilized.

The enemy of all

But these three months were enough for the parliamentarians of the Supreme Council and the Vice-President of Russia Alexander Rutsky to declare the need to resign the government and make a radical turn in the country’s economic course. The recipe for prosperity was simple: reduce taxes and prices, and increase wages - points that are, in fact, mutually exclusive.

Gaidar and his team reacted quickly to such statements - with an immediate announcement of the resignation of the cabinet of ministers due to the inability to take on the populist obligations imposed by the Supreme Council. But this did not satisfy the deputies - it would seem that everyone wanted the government to leave, but apparently no one else wanted to take real responsibility for what was happening in the country. On the same day, the Supreme Council approved the ongoing reforms.

However, lobbyists economic course- mainly the former Soviet nomenklatura - began immediately after the Congress to put pressure on Yeltsin, convincing him to create a bloc in the government as a counterweight to Gaidar’s. The president did not do this and continued to support the reforms carried out by Gaidar’s team, which is why these people began to spread rumors that Yeltsin was dancing to the tune of the West, and the final result of the reforms was to hand the country over to be torn to pieces by representatives of foreign capital. It is here that we should look for the origins of the attempt to seize power by conservative groups in October 1993.

Privatize it

The third stage of reforms was the official beginning of privatization, although it had been going on unofficially in the country since 1986 - full power at enterprises was given to directors, and so-called cooperation (essentially private business) developed. In 1992, Anatoly Chubais announced the publication of privatization checks - a certificate that gave every citizen the right to a piece of state property.

At enterprises, vouchers were exchanged for shares - in total, it was decided to transfer 51 percent of the shares of each plant or factory to the labor collectives, so that the workers would become their co-owners. But in reality, privatization checks from the financially illiterate population were bought for next to nothing by the same directors.

Vouchers were also bought from the people by investment funds, which, in theory, were supposed to invest them profitably and pay dividends to their clients. The latest legend is that, of course, privatization checks were sold by these funds to individuals interested in purchasing state real estate.

Results

The history of the Gaidar-Yeltsin government ended in December 1992. The Supreme Council did not approve him as prime minister of the country. They say that the point is not so much in unpopular reforms, but in the fact that all his opponents came to him before the vote and demanded to bring their people into the government and offered money. According to this version, Gaidar’s refusal to play by their rules led to his resignation.

Assessments of his government's reforms vary sharply. Some say that there was no alternative to Gaidar’s reforms. Others claim that it was he who destroyed great country or they simply acted too abruptly, in a hurry. The same Grigory Yavlinsky, one of the authors of “500 Days,” subsequently argued that Russia was not at all threatened with famine - the shadow economy worked perfectly, and the disaster would not have happened if the transformations had been carried out measuredly, orderly, gradually.

There is another point of view. Supporters of Yegor Gaidar's policies are confident that it is necessary to take into account not only the economic, but also the political situation in the country: the complete collapse of institutions, unrest among citizens, confusion and anarchy. It was this, and not just the threat of famine, that, in their opinion, posed the main threat - simply no one would tolerate gradual reforms. Whether this is true or not, one can guess forever, but Yegor Gaidar did his job and left. There could have been someone else in his place, with different views on the problem, but it was he.