Tyumen Higher Military Engineering command school named after Marshal of Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakova continues the military and glorious traditions of the Tallinn Military Infantry School, the formation of which began on August 17, 1940 in the military town of Tondi, in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia. Initially, the school consisted of two battalions: 1 battalion was staffed by Red Army soldiers - participants in the battles with the White Finns, the youth of Leningrad and the Leningrad, Pskov and Novgorod regions; The 2nd battalion was entirely staffed by the youth of the Republic of Estonia.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the educational process at the school was interrupted, the school received an order from the Commander of the North-Western Front: to create, together with working detachments, a powerful defense area on the outskirts of Tallinn, carry out patrol service in the city, fight enemy agents, banditry, and also carry out tasks for mining of tank-hazardous areas and objects subject to destruction. When performing these tasks, courage and heroism became the norm of behavior for officers and cadets of the school. No matter how important it was to carry out combat missions at the front, the war did not remove from the school its main task - training commanders for the front. By order People's Commissar The defense school was withdrawn from the combat area and evacuated to the rear.

On July 15, the school left Tallinn on two echelons. The road was difficult. The echelons repeatedly came under fire from enemy troops. At railway stations, cadets provided assistance to the population in eliminating fires, rescuing state property, and restoring tracks destroyed by enemy bombing.

On July 25 and 26, 1941, the 1st and 2nd echelons with personnel arrived in the city of Slavgorod Altai Territory. The school did not stay in Slavgorod for long; at the end of August the school was transferred to Tyumen, Ural Military District.

From August 27, 1941, the school was called the 2nd Tyumen Military Infantry School, and from September 16, 1941, having become part of the West Siberian Military District, the school received its former name - Tallinn Military Infantry School.

On September 10, 1941, the school made its first early graduation of officers. The front received 551 officers with the rank of lieutenant. In connection with the war, the training period for cadets was reduced to 6 months, and the enrollment of cadets was increased from two to five battalions. The school's first class graduates were mainly sent to the 368th Infantry Division, which was formed in the city of Tyumen. Graduates of Estonian nationality went to the command of the 7th and 249th Estonian divisions, which were formed near Chelyabinsk.

During the Great Patriotic War, the school trained and graduated more than 4.5 thousand officers who showed courage, heroism and bravery on the war fronts. Graduates of the school fought at Stalingrad, defended Leningrad and Karelia, participated in the battles of Kursk and the Dnieper, liberated the Baltic states and Belarus, and everywhere showed remarkable moral and combat qualities: courage, heroism, selfless devotion to the Motherland.

Twelve years after the Great Patriotic War, the school continued to graduate infantry officers.

At the end of the 50s, the reorganization and rearmament of all branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the military took place, and the restructuring of the military system began. educational institutions.

In connection with the order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR and the directive of the General Staff of the Army of June 22, 1957, the Tyumen Military School was reorganized into the Tyumen Military Engineering School (TVIU) with the task of training officers for the engineering troops. 1st, 2nd, 3rd year cadets from the former Leningrad and Moscow military engineering schools arrived to staff the school. The command and teaching staff of the school was staffed by experienced officers, many of whom were participants in the Great Patriotic War, who went through extensive training in academies and service in units. By decision of the commander of the district troops, classes at the school began on November 15, 1957.

As an inheritance from the infantry school, TVIU received one 2-story barracks; two educational buildings, a support battalion was located on one floor of the 2nd educational building; 2-storey building where the school administration and club were located; auto repair shops in a small shed; cadet canteen for 200 seats; parade ground; two houses for officers.

The cadets who graduated from the school were awarded military rank"lieutenant" and qualifications "construction technician" and "mechanical technician".

Changes in military affairs, greater saturation of the engineering troops with new equipment, increased requirements for command personnel were the reason for the school’s transition to the program higher education.

In accordance with the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated January 11, 1968, on the basis of the order of the USSR Ministry of Defense dated January 31, 1968, the school was transformed into a higher military engineering command school.

In April 1974, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution “On perpetuating the memory of Marshal of the Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakov.” Based on this Resolution, Order No. 107 of the USSR Ministry of Defense was issued on April 30, 1974, and the school was given the name “Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School named after Marshal of the Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakov.”

For reference: Alexey Ivanovich Proshlyakov was one of the outstanding Soviet military leaders. He was born on February 5, 1901 in the village of Golenishchevo, Ryazan region, into a working-class family. In the Red Army from the age of 19. During the Great Patriotic War, he held high positions: he was the chief of the army engineering troops at Western Front, Deputy Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Engineering Directorate of the Central and Bryansk Fronts (1941), Deputy Commander - Chief of the Engineering Troops of the Southern, Stalingrad, Don, Central, Belorussian and 1st Belorussian Fronts (1942-1945). In May 1945 Proshlyakov A.I. was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union for engineering support, personal courage and heroism shown in the Battle of Berlin. From 1952 to 1965, Alexey Ivanovich was the head of the engineering troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1961, A.I. Proshlyakov was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Engineering Troops, and since February 1965 he has been a military inspector-adviser of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Alexey Ivanovich died on December 12, 1973. In honor of the memory of Marshal of the Engineering Troops Alexei Ivanovich Proshlyakov, a bust of the hero was erected on the territory of the school.

In 1992, the school switched to a 5-year training program. In the same year, a new specialization was introduced at the school - engineering and sapper for the Airborne Forces.

In August 1998, in accordance with the Government Decree Russian Federation Military Engineering Academy named after. V.V. Kuibysheva was transformed into the Military Engineering University with three branches. The Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School was transformed into the Tyumen branch of the Military Engineering University, which made it possible to quickly solve scientific problems, contributed to improving the methodological support of the educational process, and increasing the practical orientation in training cadets.

On July 9, 2004, the Government of the Russian Federation decided to create the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School (TVVIKU) on the basis of the Tyumen branch of the Military Engineering University.

On June 22, 2007, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Tyumen VVIKU was awarded a new Battle Banner with Russian symbols. The Old Red Banner was transferred to the museum for storage.

By order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated December 24, 2008 and directive of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation No. D-31dsp, the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School was reorganized into a Branch of the Federal State Military Educational Institution of Higher Education " Military Academy troops of radiation, chemical and biological protection and engineering troops named after Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko" of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (branch, Tyumen) - Tyumen Military Institute of Engineering Troops.

Since 2010, the school has been training highly qualified military engineering specialists for foreign countries.

By order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated September 27, 2011 No. 1639-r and in accordance with the order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation dated March 23, 2012 No. 610, the school was reorganized into the Tyumen branch of the Military Training and Research Center Ground Forces"Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation."

From September 1, 2013, on the basis of the Resolution of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the school was reassigned to the head of the engineering troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with the return of the historical name “Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School named after Marshal of the Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakov.

In the same year, Colonel Dmitry Feliksovich Evmenenko was appointed head of the school.

Throughout the years, officers who graduated from the school carried out combat missions in peacetime. They played an important role in clearing mines from explosive objects remaining on our land after the Great Patriotic War. More than 500 graduates performed international duty in Angola, Ethiopia, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan and other “hot spots”. Graduates of the school, commanding engineering units and divisions, played an important role in ensuring order for the disarmament of illegal armed groups in the territory Chechen Republic, as well as in ensuring peace in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, in South Ossetia, in Transnistria, Yugoslavia, provided engineering support for the Tajik-Afghan border. Graduates of the school made a special contribution to the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant,

In honor of the memory of graduates of the school who heroically died during hostilities in “hot spots” and who fulfilled their military duty to the end in various armed conflicts, a memorial stele was installed on the territory of the school for graduates who gave their lives in the name of the Fatherland and a memorial was created for fallen military engineers of all generations.

Dozens of engineering officers with combat experience currently serve and work at the school.

The school prepares certified education specialists with full military special training in four military specialties and three military specializations.

Military specialties with a training period of 5 years:

• “Use of engineering units and operation of engineering weapons” in accordance with Federal State Educational Standard for Higher Education 05.23.02 Vehicles special purpose(qualification is assigned - engineer);
• “Use of units and operation of engineering electrical equipment” in accordance with Federal State Educational Standard VPO 140107 Heat and electrical supply of special technical systems and facilities (qualification is assigned - specialist);
• “The use of controlled mining units and the operation of radio-electronic means of engineering weapons” in accordance with Federal State Educational Standard VO 11.05.02 Special radio engineering systems (qualification is assigned - engineer of special radio engineering systems).

Military specialty with a training period of 5.5 years:

• “Use of engineering positional units, construction and operation of fortifications, and camouflage” in accordance with Federal State Educational Standard 05.05.01 Construction of unique buildings and structures (qualification is assigned - civil engineer).

Military specializations, in accordance with Federal State Educational Standard VO 23.05.02 Special purpose vehicles (qualification is assigned - engineer):

• “Use of Airborne Forces engineering units and operation of engineering weapons”;
• “The use of pontoon-bridges, ferry-landing units and the operation of engineering weapons”;
• “The use of engineering units of the Strategic Missile Forces and the operation of engineering weapons.”

Duration of training - 5 years.

Those who graduate from the school are awarded the military rank of LIEUTENANT.

The school also trains certified secondary specialists vocational education with secondary military special training in military specialties:

• “Use of engineering units and operation of engineering weapons” in accordance with Federal State Educational Standard SPO 15.02.04 Special machines and devices; with a specialization in “Repair and storage of engineering ammunition.”
• “Use of engineering units and operation of electrical equipment” in accordance with Federal State Educational Standard SPO 13.02.07 Electricity supply (industries).

Duration of training: 2 years 10 months.

Those who graduate from the school are awarded the military rank of WARRANT OFFICER and given a state diploma with the qualification of TECHNICIAN.

(I) K: Educational institutions founded in 1932

Military Institute (engineering troops) of the Combined Arms Academy Armed Forces Russian Federation - structural unit OVA of the Russian Armed Forces. During Soviet times Military Engineering Order of Lenin, Red Banner Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev. Currently, it is the main training and methodological center for the engineering troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Story

Engineering Academy in St. Petersburg

Both the Military Engineering and Technical University in St. Petersburg and the Military Institute of Engineering Troops in Moscow (formerly the Kuibyshev Academy) are claiming succession to the Nikolaev Engineering Academy. Petersburgers refer to the fact that on June 10, 1939, a decree of the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was signed, and an order was issued by the People's Commissar of the Navy on the formation in Leningrad of the Higher Naval Civil Engineering School of the RKKVMF, where the naval engineering faculty of the academy was returned and a separate part was attached - Leningrad Institute of Industrial Construction Engineers.

Academy named after Kuibyshev

The Military Engineering Academy was created by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated March 21, 1932, on the basis of the academy's engineering faculty, which moved to Moscow, and using the base of the Higher Civil Engineering School. Three years later, the academy was named after V.V. Kuibyshev.

The academy occupied the old house of the Durasovs on Pokrovsky Boulevard. In 1932, a new building was built for the Military Engineering Academy on the site of the right wing of the estate on the corner of Vorontsovo Pole Street (architect A. Kruglov). From November 1941 to December 1943, the academy was evacuated to the city of Frunze.

Chairman for many years state commission for the defense of diploma projects Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev was a graduate of the Nikolaev School D.M. Karbyshev. Prominent scientists taught at the academy: Hero Socialist Labor I. M. Rabinovich, professors M. M. Filonenko-Borodich, V. K. Dmokhovsky, V. M. Keldysh, A. F. Loleit.

After joining the Combined Arms Academy of the Russian Armed Forces Military Institute (engineering troops) remained the main training and methodological center of the engineering troops. It trains officers for the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Border Service of the FSB, as well as for a number of foreign armies.

IN institute There are faculties: command engineering, command of the Internal Troops, command of the Border Service, geodetic, retraining and advanced training, civil defense. There is a branch distance learning. There are 17 departments, including tactics of engineering troops, control of engineering troops, fortification and camouflage, engineering barriers, road vehicles and crossings, etc.

IN institute There is a research center, the main areas of research of which are combat engineering, tactics of engineering troops, fortification equipment of the area, the use and overcoming of obstacles, the preparation and maintenance of troop movement routes and crossings, camouflage of troops, etc.

Since 1998, in accordance with the resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev(Moscow) transformed into Military Engineering University with three branches: St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod and Tyumen.

Chief institute was appointed deputy head of the Combined Arms Academy of the Russian Armed Forces, Major General (2004, since 2008, Lieutenant General) Yu. P. Balkhovitin (born in 1958), since August 1, 2008 - head of the engineering troops of the Ground Forces. Fired from military service November 24, 2009 in connection with a major fire at the 31st arsenal of the Russian Defense Ministry in Ulyanovsk on November 13, 2009.

Famous teachers

• D. M. Karbyshev, Hero of the Soviet Union
• I. M. Rabinovich, Hero of Socialist Labor
• M. M. Filonenko-Borodich, professor, Honored Worker of Science and Technology of the RSFSR
• V. K. Dmokhovsky, professor
• V. M. Keldysh, professor
• G. G. Carlsen, professor
• A.F. Loleit, professor
• A. A. Zubkov, senior lecturer
• A. S. Fisenko, professor, head of the department of industrial structures
• B. F. Zarako-Zarakovsky, Soviet and Polish military leader, lieutenant general of the Soviet Army and division general of the Polish Army

Graduates

Prominent military leaders of the engineering troops were students of the St. Petersburg and Moscow academies:

• Chief of the Red Army Engineering Troops in 1941-1942, Major General of the Engineering Troops L.Z. Kotlyar;
• Chief of the Red Army Engineering Troops since 1942, First Marshal of the Engineering Troops M.P. Vorobyov;
• Head of the Engineering Department of the People's Commissariat Navy during the war, Lieutenant General of the Engineering Troops P.I. Sudbin;
• Chief of Staff of the Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army B.V. Blagoslavov
• Chief of Staff of the Red Army Engineering Troops, Colonel General of the Engineering Troops K. S. Nazarov;
• Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov.

The heads of the engineering troops of the fronts during the war were graduates of the academy N.P. Baranov, B.V. Blagoslavov, Yu. V. Bordzilovsky, B. V. Bychevsky, I. P. Galitsky, V. F. Zotov, N. F. Kirchevsky, Z. I. Kolesnikov, V. V. Kosarev, G. G. Nevsky, I. A. Petrov, N. M. Pilipets, A. I. Proshlyakov, A. I. Smirnov-Nesvitsky, A. F. Khrenov, A. D. Tsirlin, V. F. Shestakov.

Among the graduates of the academy are outstanding military engineers and scientists E.V. Alexandrov, G.G. Azgaldov, M.G. Barkhin, S.A. Ilyasevich, N.S. Kasperovich, N.L. Kirpichev, A.R. Shulyachenko , G. M. Salamakhin, B. G. Skramtaev, Art. teacher V.M. Zaitsev (candidate of technical sciences) and others.

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Notes

Literature

• Under the general editorship of A. D. Tsirlin, Red Banner Military Engineering Academy named after V. V. Kuibyshev, Brief historical essay. - Moscow (M.), VIA, 1966.
• Military Engineering Academy named after. Kuibyshev 150 years old, M.: Voenizdat, 1969.
• 150 years of the Military Engineering Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev., M., Factory named after. Dunaeva, 1969.
• Tsirlin A.D., Biryukov P.I., Istomin V.P., Fedoseev E.N. Engineer troops in the battles for the Soviet Motherland. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1970.
• Shevchuk A. B. et al. Military Engineering University is 180 years old. - M.: VIU, 1999.
• Military encyclopedic dictionary engineering troops. - M.: VIA, 2004.
• Zelensky V. E. Monuments of military engineering art: historical memory modern society and new objects of cultural heritage of Russia

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An excerpt characterizing the Military Institute (engineering troops) of the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

The totality of causes of phenomena is inaccessible to the human mind. But the need to find reasons is embedded in the human soul. And the human mind, without delving into the innumerability and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, each of which separately can be represented as a cause, grabs the first, most understandable convergence and says: this is the cause. In historical events (where the object of observation is the actions of people), the most primitive convergence seems to be the will of the gods, then the will of those people who stand in the most prominent historical place - historical heroes. But you just have to delve into the essence of each historical event, that is, into the activity of the entire mass of people who participated in the event, in order to make sure that the will of the historical hero not only does not guide the actions of the masses, but is itself constantly guided. It would seem that it is all the same to understand the significance of the historical event one way or another. But between the man who says that the peoples of the West went to the East because Napoleon wanted it, and the man who says that it happened because it had to happen, there is the same difference that existed between the people who argued that the earth stands firmly and the planets move around it, and those who said that they do not know what the earth rests on, but they know that there are laws governing the movement of it and other planets. There are no and cannot be reasons for a historical event, except for the only cause of all reasons. But there are laws that govern events, partly unknown, partly groped by us. The discovery of these laws is possible only when we completely renounce the search for causes in the will of one person, just as the discovery of the laws of planetary motion became possible only when people renounced the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe affirmation of the earth.

After the Battle of Borodino, the enemy’s occupation of Moscow and its burning, historians recognize the most important episode of the War of 1812 as the movement of the Russian army from the Ryazan to the Kaluga road and to the Tarutino camp - the so-called flank march behind Krasnaya Pakhra. Historians attribute the glory of this ingenious feat to various individuals and argue about who, in fact, it belongs to. Even foreign, even French historians recognize the genius of the Russian commanders when speaking about this flank march. But why military writers, and everyone after them, believe that this flank march is a very thoughtful invention of some one person, which saved Russia and destroyed Napoleon, is very difficult to understand. In the first place, it is difficult to understand wherein lies the profundity and genius of this movement; for in order to guess that the best position of the army (when it is not attacked) is where there is more food, it does not require much mental effort. And everyone, even a stupid thirteen-year-old boy, could easily guess that in 1812 the most advantageous position of the army, after the retreat from Moscow, was on the Kaluga road. So, it is impossible to understand, firstly, by what conclusions historians reach the point of seeing something profound in this maneuver. Secondly, it is even more difficult to understand exactly what historians see as the salvation of this maneuver for the Russians and its detrimental nature for the French; for this flank march, under other preceding, accompanying and subsequent circumstances, could have been detrimental for the Russians and salutary for French troops. If from the time this movement took place, the position of the Russian army began to improve, then it does not follow from this that this movement was the reason for this.
This flank march not only could not have brought any benefits, but could have destroyed the Russian army if other conditions had not coincided. What would have happened if Moscow had not burned down? If Murat had not lost sight of the Russians? If Napoleon had not been inactive? What if the Russian army, on the advice of Bennigsen and Barclay, had given battle at Krasnaya Pakhra? What would have happened if the French had attacked the Russians when they were going after Pakhra? What would have happened if Napoleon had subsequently approached Tarutin and attacked the Russians with at least one tenth of the energy with which he attacked in Smolensk? What would have happened if the French had marched on St. Petersburg?.. With all these assumptions, the salvation of a flank march could turn into destruction.
Thirdly, and the most incomprehensible, is that people who study history deliberately do not want to see that the flank march cannot be attributed to any one person, that no one ever foresaw it, that this maneuver, just like the retreat in Filyakh, in the present, was never presented to anyone in its entirety, but step by step, event by event, moment by moment, flowed from a countless number of very diverse conditions, and only then was presented in all its entirety when it was completed and became the past.
At the council in Fili, the dominant thought among the Russian authorities was a self-evident retreat in a direct direction back, that is, along the Nizhny Novgorod road. Evidence of this is that the majority of votes at the council were cast in this sense, and, most importantly, the well-known conversation after the council of the commander-in-chief with Lansky, who was in charge of the provisions department. Lanskoy reported to the commander-in-chief that food for the army was collected mainly along the Oka, in the Tula and Kaluga provinces, and that in the event of a retreat to Nizhny, food supplies would be separated from the army by the large Oka River, through which transportation in the first winter was impossible. This was the first sign of the need to deviate from what had previously seemed the most natural direct direction to Nizhny. The army stayed further south, along the Ryazan road, and closer to the reserves. Subsequently, the inaction of the French, who even lost sight of the Russian army, concerns about protecting the Tula plant and, most importantly, the benefits of getting closer to their reserves, forced the army to deviate even further south, onto the Tula road. Having crossed in a desperate movement beyond Pakhra to the Tula road, the military leaders of the Russian army thought to remain near Podolsk, and there was no thought about the Tarutino position; but countless circumstances and the appearance again of French troops, who had previously lost sight of the Russians, and battle plans, and, most importantly, the abundance of provisions in Kaluga, forced our army to deviate even more to the south and move to the middle of the routes for their food supplies, from the Tula to the Kaluga road, to Tarutin. Just as it is impossible to answer the question of when Moscow was abandoned, it is also impossible to answer when exactly and by whom it was decided to go to Tarutin. Only when the troops had already arrived at Tarutin as a result of countless differential forces, then people began to assure themselves that they had wanted this and had long foreseen it.

The famous flank march consisted only of Russian army, retreating straight back in the opposite direction of the offensive, after the French offensive had ceased, he deviated from the initially accepted direct direction and, not seeing pursuit behind him, naturally moved in the direction where the abundance of food attracted him.
If we were to imagine not brilliant commanders at the head of the Russian army, but simply one army without leaders, then this army could not do anything other than move back to Moscow, describing an arc from the side on which there was more food and the region was more abundantly.
This movement from the Nizhny Novgorod to the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads was so natural that the marauders of the Russian army ran away in this very direction and that in this very direction it was required from St. Petersburg that Kutuzov move his army. In Tarutino, Kutuzov received almost a reprimand from the sovereign for withdrawing the army to the Ryazan road, and he was pointed out the same position against Kaluga in which he was already at the time he received the sovereign’s letter.
Rolling back in the direction of the push given to it during the entire campaign and in the Battle of Borodino, the ball of the Russian army, having destroyed the force of the push and not receiving new shocks, took the position that was natural to it.
Kutuzov's merit did not lie in some brilliant, as they call it, strategic maneuver, but in the fact that he alone understood the significance of the event that was taking place. He alone understood even then the meaning of the inaction of the French army, he alone continued to assert that Battle of Borodino there was a victory; he alone - the one who, it would seem, due to his position as commander-in-chief, should have been called to an offensive - he alone used all his strength to keep the Russian army from useless battles.
The killed animal near Borodino lay somewhere where the hunter who ran away had left it; but whether he was alive, whether he was strong, or whether he was just hiding, the hunter did not know. Suddenly the groan of this beast was heard.
The groan of this wounded beast, the French army, which exposed its destruction, was the sending of Lauriston to Kutuzov’s camp with a request for peace.
Napoleon, with his confidence that it is not only good that is good, but what came into his head that is good, wrote to Kutuzov the words that first came to his mind and had no meaning. He wrote:

“Monsieur le prince Koutouzov,” he wrote, “j"envoie pres de vous un de mes aides de camps generaux pour vous entretenir de plusieurs objets interessants. Je desire que Votre Altesse ajoute foi a ce qu"il lui dira, surtout lorsqu" il exprimera les sentiments d"estime et de particuliere consideration que j"ai depuis longtemps pour sa personne... Cette lettre n"etant a autre fin, je prie Dieu, Monsieur le prince Koutouzov, qu"il vous ait en sa sainte et digne garde ,
Moscou, le 3 Octobre, 1812. Signe:
Napoleon."
[Prince Kutuzov, I am sending you one of my general adjutants to negotiate with you on many important subjects. I ask Your Lordship to believe everything that he tells you, especially when he begins to express to you the feelings of respect and special reverence that I have had for you for a long time. Therefore, I pray to God to keep you under his sacred roof.
Moscow, October 3, 1812.
Napoleon. ]

“Je serais maudit par la posterite si l"on me regardait comme le premier moteur d"un accommodation quelconque. Tel est l "esprit actuel de ma nation", [I would be damned if they looked at me as the first instigator of any deal; such is the will of our people.] - answered Kutuzov and continued to use all his strength to do so to keep troops from advancing.
In the month of the robbery of the French army in Moscow and the quiet stop of the Russian army near Tarutin, a change occurred in the strength of both troops (spirit and number), as a result of which the advantage of strength was on the side of the Russians. Despite the fact that the position of the French army and its strength were unknown to the Russians, how soon the attitude changed, the need for an offensive was immediately expressed in countless signs. These signs were: the sending of Lauriston, and the abundance of provisions in Tarutino, and information coming from all sides about the inaction and disorder of the French, and the recruitment of our regiments with recruits, and good weather, and the long rest of Russian soldiers, and the rest that usually arises in the troops as a result of rest. impatience to carry out the task for which everyone was gathered, and curiosity about what was happening in the French army, so long lost from sight, and the courage with which Russian outposts were now snooping around the French stationed in Tarutino, and news of easy victories over the French by the peasants and the partisans, and the envy aroused by this, and the feeling of revenge that lay in the soul of every person as long as the French were in Moscow, and (most importantly) the unclear, but arose in the soul of every soldier, consciousness that the relationship of force had now changed and the advantage is on our side. The essential balance of forces changed, and an offensive became necessary. And immediately, just as surely as the chimes on a clock begin to strike and play when the hand has made a full circle, higher spheres, corresponding to a significant change in forces, increased movement, hissing and playing of chimes were reflected.

The Russian army was controlled by Kutuzov with his headquarters and the sovereign from St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg, even before receiving news of the abandonment of Moscow, a detailed plan for the entire war was drawn up and sent to Kutuzov for guidance. Despite the fact that this plan was drawn up on the assumption that Moscow was still in our hands, this plan was approved by headquarters and accepted for execution. Kutuzov only wrote that long-range sabotage is always difficult to carry out. And to resolve the difficulties encountered, new instructions and persons were sent who were supposed to monitor his actions and report on them.
In addition, now the entire headquarters in the Russian army has been transformed. The places of the murdered Bagration and the offended, retired Barclay were replaced. They thought very seriously about what would be better: to place A. in B.’s place, and B. in D.’s place, or, on the contrary, D. in A.’s place, etc., as if anything other than the pleasure of A. and B., it could depend on this.
At the army headquarters, on the occasion of Kutuzov’s hostility with his chief of staff, Bennigsen, and the presence of the sovereign’s trusted representatives and these movements, a more than usual complex game of parties was going on: A. undermined B., D. under S., etc. ., in all possible movements and combinations. With all these undermining, the subject of intrigue was mostly the military matter that all these people thought to lead; but this military matter went on independently of them, exactly as it should have gone, that is, never coinciding with what people came up with, but flowing from the essence of the attitude of the masses. All these inventions, crossing and intertwining, represented in the higher spheres only a true reflection of what was about to happen.
“Prince Mikhail Ilarionovich! – the sovereign wrote on October 2 in a letter received after the Battle of Tarutino. – Since September 2, Moscow has been in enemy hands. Your last reports are from the 20th; and during this entire time, not only has nothing been done to act against the enemy and liberate the capital, but even, according to your latest reports, you have retreated back. Serpukhov is already occupied by an enemy detachment, and Tula, with its famous and so necessary for the army factory, is in danger. From reports from General Wintzingerode, I see that the enemy 10,000th Corps is moving along the St. Petersburg road. Another, in several thousand, is also being submitted to Dmitrov. The third moved forward along the Vladimir road. The fourth, quite significant, stands between Ruza and Mozhaisk. Napoleon himself was in Moscow on the 25th. According to all this information, when the enemy fragmented his forces with strong detachments, when Napoleon himself was still in Moscow, with his guards, is it possible that the enemy forces in front of you were significant and did not allow you to act offensively? With probability, on the contrary, it must be assumed that he is pursuing you with detachments, or at least a corps, much weaker than the army entrusted to you. It seemed that, taking advantage of these circumstances, you could profitably attack an enemy weaker than you and destroy him or, at least, forcing him to retreat, retain in our hands a noble part of the provinces now occupied by the enemy, and thereby avert the danger from Tula and our other inner cities. It will remain your responsibility if the enemy is able to send a significant corps to St. Petersburg to threaten this capital, in which there could not be many troops left, for with the army entrusted to you, acting with determination and activity, you have all the means to avert this new misfortune. Remember that you still owe a response to the offended fatherland for the loss of Moscow. You have experienced my willingness to reward you. This readiness will not weaken in me, but I and Russia have the right to expect on your part all the zeal, firmness and success that your mind, your military talents and the courage of the troops led by you foretell to us.”