/ Occupation of the Ruhr

The true content of this diplomatic Occupation document became clear the very next day. On January 11, 1923, detachments of Franco-Belgian troops of several thousand people occupied Essen and its surroundings. A state of siege was declared in the city. The German government responded to these events by recalling by telegraph its ambassador Mayer from Paris, and envoy Landsberg from Brussels. All German diplomatic representatives abroad were instructed to present in detail to the respective governments all the circumstances of the case and to protest against the “violent policy of France and Belgium, contrary to international law.” President Ebert's appeal "To the German People" of January 11 also announced the need to protest "against violence against law and the peace treaty." Germany's formal protest was stated on January 12, 1923, in the German government's response to the Belgian and French note. “The French government,” read the German note, “is trying in vain to disguise a serious violation of the treaty by giving a peaceful explanation for its actions. The fact that the army crosses the border of unoccupied German territory with wartime composition and weapons characterizes France’s actions as a military action.”

“This is not a question of reparations,” Chancellor Cuno said in his speech in the Reichstag on January 13. — This is about an old goal that has been set by French policy for more than 400 years... This policy was most successfully pursued by Louis XIV and Napoleon I; but other rulers of France adhered to it no less clearly to this day.”

British diplomacy continued to remain an outwardly indifferent witness to developing events. She assured France of her loyalty.

But behind the diplomatic scenes, England was preparing the defeat of France. D'Abernon conducted continuous negotiations with the German government on methods of fighting against the occupation.

The German government was advised to respond to the French policy of occupying the Ruhr with "passive resistance". The latter was to be expressed in the organization of the struggle against France’s use of the economic wealth of the Ruhr, as well as in the sabotage of the activities of the occupation authorities.

The initiative to pursue this policy came from Anglo-American circles. D'Abernon himself strongly attributes it to American influence. “In the post-war development of Germany, American influence was decisive,” he states. “Remove actions taken on American advice,

either in supposed agreement with American opinion, or in anticipation of American approval - and the whole course of German policy would have been completely different.”

As for British diplomacy, as facts show, it not only had no real intention of keeping Poincaré from the Ruhr adventure, but secretly sought to incite a Franco-German conflict. Curzon made his demarches against the occupation of the Ruhr only for appearances; in reality, he did nothing to prevent its implementation. Moreover, both Curzon and his agent, the English ambassador in Berlin, Lord d'Abernon, believed that the Ruhr conflict could mutually weaken both France and Germany. And this would lead to British dominance in the arena of European politics.

The Soviet government took a completely independent position on the issue of occupation of the Ruhr.

Openly condemning the capture of the Ruhr, the Soviet government warned that this act not only could not lead to the stabilization of the international situation, but clearly threatened a new European war. The Soviet government understood that the Ruhr occupation was as much the result of Poincaré’s aggressive policy as the fruit of the provocative actions of the German imperialist bourgeoisie, led by the German “people’s party” of Stinnes. Warning the peoples of the whole world that this dangerous game could end in a new military fire, the Soviet government, in an appeal to the Central Executive Committee on January 13, 1923, expressed its sympathy for the German proletariat, which was becoming the first victim of the provocative policy of disasters pursued by the German imperialists.

How As already noted, the instability of the Versailles-Washington system manifested itself in a series of international conflicts and political crises. The most acute of them was the so-called Ruhr crisis, related to the solution of the reparation issue. This crisis reflected both Germany's growing opposition to fulfilling the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the contradictions between its drafters - the Allied powers.

Openly proclaiming the central task of his foreign policy revision of the humiliating decrees of Versailles. Germany for the first time post-war period did not have sufficient strength to implement it. Hence the tactics of “hidden counteraction” while simultaneously accumulating economic and military power and attempting to strengthen their international positions. Such tactics included the following areas of activity. In the early 1920s. German government and military circles paid special attention to creating the basis for restoring military potential. According to the doctrine of the Reichswehr commander, General Hans von Seeckt, the “small army” that existed in the Weimar Republic, and especially its 4 thousand-!1b!;; The officer corps was seen as a base for the rapid deployment of large-scale armed forces. In Germany, the Great General Staff continued to function secretly. Military production was almost completely preserved. It is no coincidence that in 1923 Germany came into fourth place in the world (after England, the USA and France) in the export of weapons and military materials.

In order to improve its international position, the German government quite effectively used two means: taking advantage of the contradictions between France and the Anglo-Saxon powers, as well as rapprochement with Soviet Russia. In the first case, Germany managed to enlist the support of England and USA in softening the conditions for reparation payments, in the second - to achieve the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo, which was considered in the Weimar Republic as a kind of leverage over the Allied powers.

The tactics of “hidden counteraction” were most clearly manifested in the execution, a. or rather, in Germany’s failure to fulfill its reparation obligations. By formally adopting the London Reparations Plan. developed at an inter-allied conference in the spring of 1921, the German government began to successfully sabotage it in the fall of that year, citing the extremely difficult financial situation. The expectation of a favorable attitude towards this line of behavior by the British and Americans was completely justified. In June 1922 The International Committee of Bankers, chaired by J. P. Morgan (the Morgan Committee), at a meeting in Paris announced its agreement to provide a loan to Germany subject to a reduction “to reasonable limits” in the amount of reparations it pays. Under pressure from British representatives, the reparations commission liberated the Weimar Republic in October 1922 from cash payments for a period of 8 months. Nevertheless, in November of the same year, the government of K. Wirth sent a note to the commission, which spoke about the insolvency of Germany and put forward a demand to declare a moratorium for 4 years and provide it with large loans.

For obvious reasons, this course of events Not suited France. At the beginning of January 1923, the French Prime Minister R. Poincaré issued an ultimatum from two

->ntov. Firstly, he demanded the establishment of strict con- Gul over the finances, industry and foreign trade of Germany, trying to force her to regularly make reparation contributions. Secondly, the Prime Minister said that in the event of an emergency

"single failure to pay reparations. France on the procedure for applying sanctions occupies Ruhrskaya region. January 9

- "2! reparation commission, and which dominant

- “Did the French play, stated non-compliance Hermann-:-< обязательства по поставке угля Франции в счетreparations.

adoring it as “intentional.” In a day. 11January. Franco-Belgian troops entered to the Ruhr.

Thus began the Ruhr crisis, which sharply aggravated the situation both in Germany itself and in the international arena.

The government of V. Cuno, having officially proclaimed a policy of “passive resistance” and calling on the population of the occupied territories to “civil disobedience”, recalled its diplomatic representatives from France and Belgium. General Seeckt in his memorandum advocated the introduction defensive war. The sharp decline in the economy increased social tensions. The danger of new revolutionary explosions in Germany, combined with the threat of further destabilization of the European international order - this was the essence of the Ruhr crisis, which shook the foundations of the Versailles system -

In terms of development international relations The Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr had the following consequences. The Ruhr crisis contributed to an even greater spread of revanchist sentiments in Germany, its orientation toward politics from a “position of strength.” The head of the new German government is Gustav Stresemann. a politician of very moderate views, stated: “I have little hope that through negotiations we will create a situation tolerable for us, allowing us to live in within Treaty of Versailles." The already conflictual relations between Germany and France, which in German political circles began to be called “enemy No. 1,” worsened. Events in the Ruhr accelerated the collapse of the Anglo-French Entente, turning the wartime “cordial agreement” into an acute confrontation in resolving German and other issues of the post-war world. In the alarming days of the crisis, the Allied powers could once again see how real the prospect of a Soviet-German rapprochement was, threatening them. Soviet Russia was the only one great powers, which strongly condemned the Franco-Bslgian war action. The VNIK’s appeal to the peoples of the world on January 13, 1923 declared: “The world has again been plunged into a state of pre-war fever. Sparks fly into the powder magazine created from Europe by the Treaty of Versailles.”

The Ruhr conflict was resolved on November 23, 1923, when the Ruhr mine owners and representatives of the Franco-Belgian control commission signed an agreement under which the former pledged to resume coal supplies to France, and the latter to begin withdrawing troops and ending the occupation of the occupied areas. However, this settlement did not address the underlying causes of the crisis, the reparation issue and the German problem as a whole. From the solution to these problems depended not only on further development, but also itself the existence of the Versailles-Washington treaty system.

SECTION II________

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DURING THE TWO STABILIZATION PERIODS

The balance of power on the world stage, the development of international relations in 1924-1929. ( general characteristics)

With the entry of capitalist countries into a period of economic and social stabilization, new stage and in the history of international relations. This stage. being a logical continuation of the previous one, it had the following distinctive features.

In the 1920s the governments of the great powers that won the world war managed to find common language And develop a coordinated line in resolving the largest international ardently&1em. The consensus reached became the basis for the further development of the Versailles-Washington system. Despite all its inconsistencies, the post-war world order, legally formalized in Paris and Washington, was not only preserved. but also in a certain sense strengthened. In any case, centripetal and constructive forces at that time prevailed over centrifugal and destructive tendencies.

Another characteristic feature period under review became widespread pacifist ideas and sentiments. Perhaps. Never before have so many peacekeeping projects been put forward and so many conferences been held to ensure peace and international security as in the twenties. It is no coincidence that in historical literature the third decade of the 20th century. often called the "era of pacifism".

Unprecedented popularity of pacifist plans and programs was explained by the action of various factors: tragic consequences of the First World War and the general desire prevent such military conflicts in future: necessity restoration of the destroyed economy and financial system, which assumed stabilization of international relations as the most important condition; activation peacekeeping activities liberal and democratic intelligentsia. as well as the coming to power in a number of European countries of politicians whose foreign policy concept was based on the principles of pacifism (E. Herriot in France. J.R. Maclonald in England, etc.).

However, the most significant reason for the surge in pacifist aspirations lay in the very nature of the international situation that had developed by the mid-1920s. Its uniqueness lay in the fact that the government circles of all great powers, without exception, although for different reasons, were interested in maintaining the peaceful status quo. The leading victorious powers (USA, England, France) opposed any attempts to forcefully deform the Versad-Washington system, the creators of which they were. The defeated states (primarily Germany), as well as powers that considered themselves “unjustly deprived” of the decisions of the Paris and Washington conferences (Italy and Japan), did not at that time have sufficient power for a military revision of the established international order and used diplomatic, i.e. peaceful means and methods for realizing their foreign policy goals - As for the Soviet Union, its party and state leadership, without abandoning the slogans of proletarian internationalism, concentrated its efforts on strengthening the international positions of the USSR based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Not the least role in the formation of this course was played by the defeat of the “anti-party group” led by L.D. Trotsky, condemnation of its revolutionary maximalism. who denied the very possibility of building socialism in the USSR without the victory of the world revolution. J.V. Stalin, proclaiming Soviet Union“lever” and “base” for the development of the world revolutionary process, defended the independent significance of socialist transformations in the country, which. in turn, required the creation of favorable foreign policy conditions, the maintenance of “world peace” and the normalization of relations with the capitalist powers. These were the real prerequisites for the “era of pacifism.”

When, on January 9, 1923, the reparations commission declared that the Weimar Republic was deliberately delaying supplies, France used this as an excuse to send troops into the Ruhr Basin. Between January 11 and January 16, 1923, French and Belgian troops, initially numbering 60,000, occupied the entire Ruhr region, taking the coal and coke production facilities there as “production collateral” to ensure Germany fulfilled its reparations obligations. As a result of the occupation, about 7% of the post-war territory of Germany was occupied, where 72% of coal was mined and more than 50% of iron and steel were produced. However, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Raymond Poincaré, sought to achieve the assignment of a status to the Rhineland and the Ruhr similar to the status of the Saar region, where the ownership of the territory of Germany was only formal, and power was in the hands of the French. The entry of occupation troops caused a wave in the Weimar Republic popular anger. The government, led by Reich Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno, called on the population to “passive resistance.”

The occupation caused discontent on the part of Great Britain and the United States and aggravated problems in Europe. The occupation of the Ruhr region ended in July-August 1925 in accordance with the 1924 Dawes Plan.

Exacerbation of the German problem:

2 factions

1) “Proversals”: ​​exact fulfillment of obligations, cooperation to mitigate the sanctions regime

2) “Pro-Eastern” - connection with heavy industry, connection of “German intellect” with Russian labor resources and raw materials

Economic problems aggravated contradictions in Germany, a serious increase in anti-Semitic sentiments (the arrival of the wealthy Jewish population from Poland, jewelers, shop owners). The population blamed them for speculative operations

In November 1923: “Munich Putsch” under the slogans of fighting foreigners, which was suppressed→ 5 years in prison by Hitler.

Dawes Plan of August 16, 1924 established a new procedure for reparation payments to Germany after the First World War, according to which their size was brought into line with economic opportunities Weimar Republic. To start the mechanism of the German economy, according to the Dawes Plan, an international loan was simultaneously provided to Germany.

On November 30, 1923, the Reparations Commission decided to create an international committee of experts chaired by Charles Dawes. The treaty was signed on August 16, 1924 in London (London Conference 1924) and came into force on September 1, 1924. Its implementation became possible only after overcoming inflation in Germany and brought the Weimar Republic into its heyday - the “golden twenties”. Implemented primarily under US pressure and thanks to the policies of Gustav Stresemann, the Dawes Plan ensured the restoration of the German economy.

Bottom line

withdrawal of French troops from Germany

Opponents Commanders Losses

unknown

unknown

Ruhr conflict- the climax of the military-political conflict between the Weimar Republic and the Franco-Belgian occupation forces in the Ruhr Basin in 1923.

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Literature

• Michael Ruck: Die Freien Gewerkschaften im Ruhrkampf 1923, Frankfurt am Main 1986;
• Barbara Muller: Passive Widerstand im Ruhrkampf. Eine Fallstudie zur gewaltlosen zwischenstaatlichen Konfliktaustragung und ihren Erfolgsbedingungen, Munster 1995;
• Stanislas Jeannesson: Poincaré, la France et la Ruhr 1922-1924. Histoire d'une occupation, Strasbourg 1998;
• Elspeth Y. O'Riordan: Britain and the Ruhr crisis,London 2001;
• Conan Fischer: The Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924, Oxford/New York 2003;
• Gerd Krumeich, Joachim Schröder (Hrsg.): Der Schatten des Weltkriegs: Die Ruhrbesetzung 1923, Essen 2004 (Düsseldorfer Schriften zur Neueren Landesgeschichte und zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens, 69);
• Gerd Krüger: "Aktiver" und passiver Widerstand im Ruhrkampf 1923, in: Besatzung. Funktion und Gestalt militärischer Fremdherrschaft von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. von Günther Kronenbitter, Markus Pöhlmann und Dierk Walter, Paderborn / München / Wien / Zürich 2006 (Krieg in der Geschichte, 28) S. 119-130.

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Excerpt characterizing the Ruhr conflict

On October 28, Kutuzov and his army crossed to the left bank of the Danube and stopped for the first time, putting the Danube between themselves and the main forces of the French. On the 30th he attacked Mortier’s division located on the left bank of the Danube and defeated it. In this case, trophies were taken for the first time: a banner, guns and two enemy generals. For the first time after a two-week retreat, the Russian troops stopped and, after a struggle, not only held the battlefield, but drove out the French. Despite the fact that the troops were stripped, exhausted, weakened by one third, backward, wounded, killed and sick; despite the fact that the sick and wounded were left on the other side of the Danube with a letter from Kutuzov, entrusting them to the philanthropy of the enemy; despite the fact that the large hospitals and houses in Krems, converted into infirmaries, could no longer accommodate all the sick and wounded, despite all this, the stop at Krems and the victory over Mortier significantly raised the morale of the troops. Throughout the entire army and in the main quarters, the most joyful, although unfair, rumors were circulating about the imaginary approach of columns from Russia, about some kind of victory won by the Austrians, and about the retreat of the frightened Bonaparte.
Prince Andrei was during the battle with the Austrian general Schmitt, who was killed in this case. A horse was wounded under him, and he himself was slightly grazed in the arm by a bullet. As a sign of the special favor of the commander-in-chief, he was sent with news of this victory to the Austrian court, which was no longer in Vienna, which was threatened by French troops, but in Brunn. On the night of the battle, excited, but not tired (despite his weak-looking build, Prince Andrei could endure physical fatigue much better than the strongest people), having arrived on horseback with a report from Dokhturov to Krems to Kutuzov, Prince Andrei was sent that same night courier to Brunn. Sending by courier, in addition to rewards, meant an important step towards promotion.
The night was dark and starry; the road turned black between the white snow that had fallen the day before, on the day of the battle. Now going over the impressions of the past battle, now joyfully imagining the impression that he would make with the news of victory, remembering the farewell of the commander-in-chief and comrades, Prince Andrei rode in the mail chaise, experiencing the feeling of a man who had waited for a long time and had finally achieved the beginning of the desired happiness. As soon as he closed his eyes, the firing of rifles and cannons was heard in his ears, which merged with the sound of wheels and the impression of victory. Then he began to imagine that the Russians were fleeing, that he himself had been killed; but he quickly woke up, with happiness as if he learned again that none of this had happened, and that, on the contrary, the French had fled. He again remembered all the details of the victory, his calm courage during the battle and, having calmed down, dozed off... After the dark starry night, a bright, cheerful morning came. The snow melted in the sun, the horses galloped quickly, and new and varied forests, fields, and villages passed indifferently to the right and left.
At one of the stations he overtook a convoy of Russian wounded. The Russian officer driving the transport, lounging on the front cart, shouted something, cursing the soldier with rude words. In the long German vans, six or more pale, bandaged and dirty wounded were shaking along the rocky road. Some of them spoke (he heard Russian dialect), others ate bread, the heaviest ones silently, with meek and painful childish sympathy, looked at the courier galloping past them.
Prince Andrei ordered to stop and asked the soldier in what case they were wounded. “The day before yesterday on the Danube,” answered the soldier. Prince Andrei took out his wallet and gave the soldier three gold coins.
“For everyone,” he added, turning to the approaching officer. “Get well, guys,” he addressed the soldiers, “there’s still a lot to do.”
- What, Mr. Adjutant, what news? – the officer asked, apparently wanting to talk.
- Good! “Forward,” he shouted to the driver and galloped on.
It was already completely dark when Prince Andrei entered Brunn and saw himself surrounded tall buildings, lights of shops, windows of houses and lanterns, beautiful carriages rustling along the pavement and all that atmosphere of a big busy city, which is always so attractive to a military man after the camp. Prince Andrei, despite the fast ride and sleepless night, approaching the palace, felt even more animated than the day before. Only the eyes sparkled with a feverish brilliance, and thoughts changed with extreme speed and clarity. All the details of the battle were vividly presented to him again, no longer vaguely, but definitely, in concise presentation, which he did in his imagination to Emperor Franz. He vividly imagined random questions that could be asked of him, and the answers that he would make to them. He believed that he would immediately be presented to the emperor. But at the large entrance of the palace an official ran out to him and, recognizing him as a courier, escorted him to another entrance.
- From the corridor to the right; there, Euer Hochgeboren, [Your Highness,] you will find the adjutant on duty,” the official told him. - He takes you to the Minister of War.
The adjutant on duty in the wing, who met Prince Andrei, asked him to wait and went to the Minister of War. Five minutes later, the aide-de-camp returned and, bending especially politely and letting Prince Andrei go ahead of him, led him through the corridor into the office where the Minister of War was working. The aide-de-camp, with his exquisite politeness, seemed to want to protect himself from the Russian adjutant's attempts at familiarity. Prince Andrei's joyful feeling weakened significantly when he approached the door of the War Minister's office. He felt insulted, and the feeling of insult at that same moment, unnoticed by him, turned into a feeling of contempt, based on nothing. His resourceful mind at the same moment suggested to him the point of view from which he had the right to despise both the adjutant and the minister of war. “They must find it very easy to win victories without smelling gunpowder!” he thought. His eyes narrowed contemptuously; He entered the office of the Minister of War especially slowly. This feeling intensified even more when he saw the Minister of War sitting over a large table and for the first two minutes did not pay attention to the newcomer. The Minister of War lowered his bald head with gray temples between two wax candles and read, marking with a pencil, the papers. He finished reading without raising his head, when the door opened and footsteps were heard.
“Take this and hand it over,” the Minister of War said to his adjutant, handing over the papers and not yet paying attention to the courier.
Prince Andrei felt that either of all the affairs that occupied the Minister of War, the actions of Kutuzov’s army could least of all interest him, or it was necessary to let the Russian courier feel this. “But I don’t care at all,” he thought. The Minister of War moved the rest of the papers, aligned their edges with the edges and raised his head. He had a smart and characteristic head. But at the same moment as he turned to Prince Andrei, the intelligent and firm expression on the face of the Minister of War, apparently habitually and consciously changed: the stupid, feigned, not hiding his pretense, smile of a man who receives many petitioners one after another stopped on his face .
– From General Field Marshal Kutuzov? – he asked. - Good news, I hope? Was there a collision with Mortier? Victory? It's time!
He took the dispatch, which was addressed to him, and began to read it with a sad expression.

"Passive resistance"

The occupation of the Ruhr led to a policy of "passive resistance" for Germany. She was proclaimed head of the Cuno government on January 13, 1923 in the Reichstag. It was approved by the majority of deputies and Ruhr industrialists led by Stinnes.

However, German politicians and industrialists did not imagine the real consequences of such a policy. Paris strengthened the occupation army and expanded the occupation zone. The French occupied Düsseldorf, Bochum, Dortmund and other rich industrial centers of the Ruhr region. They began a policy of isolating the Ruhr from Germany and other countries. The commander of the occupation forces, General Degoutte, banned the export of coal from the Ruhr to Germany. As a result, Germany lost 88% of coal, 48% of iron, 70% of cast iron. Germany was under threat of economic collapse. The fall of the German mark became catastrophic, and money depreciated at an unprecedented rate. In addition, the French began repression. Some coal miners, including Fritz Thyssen, were arrested. Krupp was warned about the sequestration of his enterprises. There was a wave of arrests of German government officials in the Ruhr and Rhineland regions.

As a result, the Cuno government's attempt to put pressure on France through diplomatic means failed. The protests of the German authorities regarding the arrests in the Ruhr region in Paris were rejected and recognized as completely legitimate. Hopes for help from England were initially also not justified. In England they expressed sympathy for Germany and condemned the policies of France, but did not want to be drawn into the conflict. British diplomacy also refused mediation.

Meanwhile, the crisis in Germany had a negative impact on England and throughout Europe. The decline in the purchasing power of the German population led to a fall in English exports and an increase in unemployment in England. At the same time, the French franc began to fall. All this caused disorganization of the European market. In Germany, there was a sharp increase in right-wing radical, nationalist and revanchist movements and organizations. Throughout Germany and especially in Bavaria, secret and overt organizations of a military and nationalist nature were formed.

All this caused alarm in Europe. On April 15, 1923, Poincaré, in a speech in Dunkirk, confirmed the validity of France's Ruhr policy. From his point of view, the occupation of the Ruhr was justified not only from economic, but also from political and military necessity. According to Poincaré, after four German invasions in one century, France has the right to ensure its security. Belgium supported France on this issue.

Due to the deteriorating situation in Europe and under pressure public opinion London has taken a more active position. On April 21, 1923, Lord Curzon gave a speech in the House of Lords in which he advised Berlin to submit new proposals on the problem of reparations. On April 22, 1923, the German Foreign Ministry announced that it was ready to consider the reparation issue, but only in connection with the recognition of German sovereignty over the Rhine and Ruhr. On May 2, 1923, the German government sent a note with proposals on the reparation issue to Belgium, France, England, Italy, the USA and Japan. Germany agreed to set the total amount of obligations at 30 billion marks in gold, while the entire amount had to be covered with foreign loans. But Berlin warned that passive resistance to Germany would continue until the occupation was ended. Germany proposed solving the reparations problem at the level of an international commission. The Germans referred to the speech of the American Secretary of State Hughes, who, in order to solve the reparations issue, proposed turning to experts, people who enjoy high authority in the financial problems of their country.

The German proposal sparked a new diplomatic scramble. France and Belgium believed that negotiations were impossible until the end of passive resistance and that they were not going to change their decisions. In addition, Germany was accused of “revolting against the Treaty of Versailles.” England invited Germany to provide more “serious and clear evidence of its willingness to pay than has been the case so far.” The Japanese reported that for Japan this issue was not of “vital importance” and proposed to solve the problem peacefully.

On June 7, 1923, Germany proposed a new memorandum to the Entente countries. It was proposed to pay reparations with bonds in the amount of 20 billion gold marks, which were secured by state railways and other property. But France was again in no hurry to respond. She again inserted a preliminary condition - the cessation of passive resistance.

England began to advocate for ending the Ruhr conflict more persistently. In May 1923, a change of cabinet took place in Britain: the resignation of Bonar Law and the appointment of Baldwin as Prime Minister. The new prime minister leaned on commercial and industrial circles and persistently sought to eliminate the Ruhr conflict. The English press began to actively argue that the financial chaos, industrial and social collapse of Germany would prevent the restoration of the economic balance of Europe and, accordingly, England.

The Ruhr conflict led to the strengthening of negative political trends in Europe. Fascist Italy, taking advantage of the Ruhr crisis, tried to begin expansion in the Mediterranean basin. The Italian government laid claim to the entire eastern Adriatic coast. The slogan was put forward to transform the Adriatic Sea into the Italian Sea. Radical politicians demanded the inclusion of a large part of Yugoslavia into the Italian Empire. Yugoslavia was declared the Italian “Saint Dalmatia”. On this wave, the Italians occupied Fiume. Italy and Yugoslavia considered this unrecognized state, proclaimed on September 8, 1920, by the Italian poet Gabriele d'Annunzio, their territory. Having not received the support of Paris, which was busy with the Ruhr problem, Yugoslavia was forced to abandon its claims to Fiume in favor of Rome. At the same time, the Italians occupied Corfu and only under pressure from England, which considered the island the key to the Adriatic Sea, did they withdraw their troops.

At this time, revolutionary chaos was growing in Germany. In August 1923, a huge strike began in the Ruhr region; more than 400 thousand workers began protests and demanded the departure of the occupiers. This strike was supported by all workers in Germany and led to another political crisis. The threat of armed confrontation has already arisen. Cuno's government resigned. As a result, the Stresemann-Hilferding coalition government was formed. In his keynote speech in Stuttgart on September 2, 1923, Stresemann stated that Germany was ready to enter into an economic agreement with France, but it would resolutely oppose attempts to dismember the country. The French softened their position and said they were ready to discuss the problem. At the same time, France again reported that it was necessary to stop passive resistance. Stresemann noted that the German government could not achieve an end to passive resistance until the Ruhr problem was resolved.

After active German-French negotiations, the German government published a declaration on September 26, 1923, in which it invited the population of the Ruhr to stop passive resistance. General economic crisis and growing in the country revolutionary movement forced Berlin to capitulate. Speculating on the possibility of a social revolution, the German government put pressure on the Entente countries. In the autumn of 1923, the situation in Germany was indeed very difficult. In Saxony, left-wing Social Democrats and Communists created a workers' government. The same government was established in Thuringia. Germany stood on the threshold of a revolutionary explosion. However, the government reacted harshly. Troops and right-wing paramilitaries were sent to the rebel provinces. The workers of the republic were defeated. The uprising was also suppressed in Hamburg. The German bourgeois government, with the support of part of the Social Democrats, won. But the situation remained difficult.

Continuation of the crisis. Failure of French plans

The world community assessed the surrender of Germany as the second war lost by the Germans. It seemed that Poincaré was close to his intended goal. Paris seized the initiative in resolving the reparations issue and a leading place in European politics. The French Prime Minister hoped to create a German-French coal-iron syndicate, which would be led by French capital. This gave France economic dominance in Western Europe And material base for military leadership on the continent.

However, Poincaré was mistaken in believing that France had won. The Germans had no intention of yielding to France. The abandonment of the policy of passive resistance was a chess move. Berlin expected that London, alarmed by the strengthening of Paris, would definitely intervene. And the French were not satisfied with this victory. They wanted to build on their success. This caused discontent in England. On October 1, 1923, Baldwin strongly condemned the intransigent position of the French government. British Foreign Minister Curzon generally stated that the only result of the occupation was economic collapse German state and the disorganization of Europe.

London enlisted the support of Washington and launched a diplomatic counteroffensive. On October 12, 1923, the British formally demanded a conference to resolve the reparations issue with the participation of the United States. The British note emphasized that the United States could not remain aloof from European problems. According to the British government, it was necessary to return the declaration of the American Secretary of State Hughes. America was to be the judge in deciding the question of reparations. England proposed convening an international conference with the participation of the United States.

Soon the United States announced that it would willingly take part in such a conference. Thus, the Anglo-Saxons lured France into a well-prepared trap. After the US announcement, British government advised Poincaré to “think carefully” before refusing this proposal.

However, the French persisted. Poincaré planned to support the separatists in Germany in order to create buffer formations between France and Germany. The French supported secessionist movements on the Rhine and in Bavaria. Poincaré's plans were based on the plans of Marshal Foch, who proposed creating a Rhineland buffer state. However, the other Entente powers rejected this plan in 1919. Foch also proposed in 1923 to seize the Ruhr and the Rhineland.

Industrialists in the Rhine-Westphalia region supported the idea of ​​creating a Rhineland state. The French High Commissioner for the Rhineland, Tirard, reported to Poinqueret that industrialists and merchants in Aachen and Mainz were clearly gravitating toward France. Many Rhenish and Westphalian firms had more ties to France than to Germany. After the occupation of the Ruhr, they were completely cut off from German markets and reoriented towards France. In addition, the revolutionary movement in Germany caused fear among a certain part of the bourgeoisie. On the night of October 21, 1923, the separatists announced the establishment of an “independent Rhine Republic.”

Almost simultaneously, the separatist movement in Bavaria intensified. The separatists were led by the Catholic Bavarian People's Party, led by Kahr. The Bavarians planned, together with the “Rhine Republic” and Austria, with the support of France, to create a Danube confederation. Kar hoped that the separation of Bavaria would allow it to be freed from paying reparations and to receive loans from the Entente powers. The Bavarians held secret negotiations with the representative of the French General Staff, Colonel Richer. The French promised the Bavarian separatists assistance and full support. But the plans of the separatists were discovered by the German authorities, so Poincaré had to dissociate himself from Richer and his plans.

However, the Bavarian separatists did not give up and in mid-October 1923, Bavaria actually separated from Germany. The units of the Reichswehr (armed forces) located in Bavaria were headed by General Lossow, who refused to obey the orders of the military command. The supreme ruler of Bavaria, Kahr, began negotiations with France. To England's request, Poincaré replied that he was not responsible for what was happening inside Germany. During a speech on November 4, 1923, Poincaré said that France did not consider itself obliged to protect the German constitution and the unity of Germany. The head of the French government recalled the “sacred principle” of self-determination of nations.

The situation was further aggravated by the Nazi putsch on November 8-9, 1923 (). The catastrophic situation in Germany and the massive impoverishment of the population led to the growth of nationalist sentiments, which were used to their advantage by representatives of large German capital. Nationalists were especially active in Bavaria, where they entered into a tactical alliance with the Bavarian separatists (the National Socialists supported the idea of ​​a single Greater Germany). The nationalists organized battle groups and sent them to the Ruhr region in order to turn passive resistance into active. The militants caused explosions on railways, accidents, attacked single French soldiers, and killed representatives of the occupation authorities. Hitler and Ludendorff attempted to seize power in Munich on November 8, 1923. Hitler hoped to organize a “march on Berlin” in Bavaria, repeating Mussolini’s success in 1922. But the “beer hall putsch” failed.

Meanwhile, Germany's economic situation worsened. The occupation of the Ruhr was an ill-considered step and led to a crisis in the French economy. Germany, even after the cessation of passive resistance, did not pay reparations and did not fulfill supply obligations. This had a hard impact on French state budget and on the franc exchange rate. In addition, the costs of the occupation were constantly growing and by the autumn of 1923 they reached 1 billion francs. Poincaré tried to delay the fall of the franc by increasing taxes by 20%. But this step did not improve the situation. In addition, the British carried out financial sabotage - English banks threw a significant amount of French currency into the money market. The franc exchange rate fell even more. Under financial and diplomatic pressure from England and the United States, France had to capitulate. Poincaré announced that France no longer objects to the convening of an international committee of experts on the problem of German reparations.

Dawes Plan

After much delay, France agreed to the opening of the committee's work. On January 14, 1924, work began in London international committee experts. US Representative Charles Dawes was chosen as its chairman. A former lawyer who received the rank of general for his participation in the war, Dawes was closely associated with the Morgan banking group. It was this group that France turned to for a loan. Morgan promised Paris a loan of $100 million, but on the condition that the issue of German reparations be resolved.

During the committee meeting, the main focus was on the problem of creating a stable currency in Germany. The Americans especially insisted on this. The British also supported them in this matter. The Dawes Commission visited Germany to study the situation of German finances. Experts came to the conclusion that Germany’s solvency will be restored only if the entire country is reunified.

On April 9, 1924, Dawes announced the completion of the work and presented the text of the experts' report. The so-called Dawes Plan consisted of three parts. In the first part, the experts made general conclusions and conveyed the committee’s point of view. The second part was devoted to the general economic situation in Germany. The third part contained a number of appendices to the first two parts.

Experts believed that Germany would be able to pay reparations only after economic recovery. To do this, the country needed help. This should have been done by Anglo-American capital. Priority was given to stabilizing the currency and creating fiscal balance. To stabilize the German mark, it was proposed to provide Berlin with an international loan in the amount of 800 million gold marks. Germany had to pledge customs duties, excise taxes and the most profitable items of the state budget as collateral. All railways were transferred to the joint stock company of railways for 40 years. The total amount of reparation payments and the deadline for their payment have not been established. Berlin only had to commit to paying 1 billion marks in the first year. Then Germany had to increase contributions and bring them to 2.5 billion marks by the end of the 1920s. The sources of covering reparation payments were the state budget, income from heavy industry and railways. In general, the entire burden of reparations fell on ordinary workers (large German capital insisted on this); they were taken away through special taxes.

It should be noted that these taxes began to be used in Germany for widespread demagogic, chauvinistic propaganda. The German capitalists kept silent about the fact that they themselves did not want to lose their profits and found ways to reimburse reparation payments at the expense of ordinary people. External enemies were declared to be to blame for the plight of the people, and the main means of getting rid of disasters was to be new war.

Overall, the Dawes Plan provided for the restoration of a strong Germany. At the same time, Anglo-American capital, in alliance with part of large German capital, was going to control the main industries national economy Germany. To ensure that there was no competition from German goods in markets dominated by British, American and French capital, the authors of the Dawes Plan “generously” provided Germany with Soviet markets. The plan was quite cunning, the masters of the West protected their markets from the powerful German economy and directed the economic and, in the future, military expansion of the Germans to the east.

On August 16, 1924, at the London Conference, a reparation plan for Germany was approved. In addition, several decisions were made at the conference important issues. France lost the opportunity to independently resolve the issue of reparations; all conflict issues had to be resolved by an arbitration commission of representatives of the Entente, headed by American representatives. France was supposed to withdraw troops from the Ruhr within a year. Instead of military intervention, financial and economic intervention was launched. An emission bank was created under the control of a foreign commissioner. Railways passed into private hands and were also managed under the control of a special foreign commissioner. France retained the right to compulsorily receive coal and other manufactured goods for a certain period of time. But Germany received the right to appeal to an arbitration commission demanding a reduction or cancellation of these supplies. Germany was provided with a loan of 800 million marks. It was provided by Anglo-American capital.

Thus, the London Conference of 1924 established the dominance of Anglo-American capital in Germany and, accordingly, in Europe. Germany was sent east. With the help of the Dawes Plan, the Anglo-Saxons hoped to turn Soviet Russia into the agricultural and raw materials appendage of the industrial West.